



MAPPING DISINFORMATION

Report on Russian and Serbian narratives in the media and
on social networks in Kosovo

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

5	Executive Summary
5	Dissemination of Disinformation
6	Trends
6	Structural problems
7	Chapter I - The Context of Disinformation in Kosovo
9	Chapter II - Methodology
11	Mapping of Disinformation Channels
13	Hybrid Threats to Security
19	Contamination of the Media Space by the Kremlin
22	The Path of Russian Disinformation: From the Kremlin to Media in Kosovo
27	Linking Kosovo to Kremlin Propaganda against Ukraine
32	Disinformation Rooted in Ideology
36	Elections Through the Eyes of the Kremlin and Belgrade
40	Disinformation During Election Periods
45	Discrediting Analysts and Journalists
46	Amplification of Disinformation Narratives About the Persecution of Serbs
49	Disinformation about Climate Change on Social Media
56	Limited Institutional Capacities to Address Disinformation
59	ANNEX
60	ANNEX 1
64	ANNEX 2

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This report presents the results of systematic monitoring, in-depth interviews, and analysis of open data conducted by **BIRN Kosovo** and **Internews Kosovo** (hereinafter: the authors) during the period **September 2025 – February 2026**, with the aim of identifying the sources, channels, and forms of disinformation in Kosovo.

The report is structured around three pillars, with findings and concrete recommendations structured around the following areas:

- The Pathways of Disinformation in Kosovo
- Institutional capacities to counter disinformation
- Legal challenges in addressing disinformation

Based on systematic analysis of the collected data, the authors identify the following problems:

Dissemination of Disinformation

- Russian disinformation sources regularly created disinformation narratives about Kosovo;
- Disinformation content continues to provoke interethnic violence and cause fear among communities, posing an ongoing risk to national and regional security;
- During the monitoring period, disinformation sources portrayed Russian political leaders as friends to Muslim;
- Kremlin narratives have contributed to the creation of channels for disseminating disinformation within Kosovo that have a broad impact on audiences;
- Global crises have been continuously exploited to spread disinformation using advanced editing and information manipulation techniques;
- Disinformation sources from Russia and Serbia have continued to generate and disseminate disinformation about current affairs developments in Kosovo;
- Interethnic issues have remained a central theme of disinformation produced by Moscow and Belgrade;
- Hate speech and disinformation have discouraged women's participation in public life, creating an environment that limits their activity and engagement;
- The dissemination of disinformation has occurred through traditional media channels, while alternative platforms like Telegram and other social media platforms have been used to expand the reach of disinformation.

Trends

- Artificial Intelligence is increasingly being used to create disinformation content;
- Russian disinformation narratives about Kosovo have begun to be disseminated in other world languages, translated with the help of Artificial Intelligence;
- Unverified sources on Telegram regarding events in Kosovo have been used to feed Russian disinformation with unconfirmed information;
- Some media in Kosovo have begun to reproduce, sometimes with edits, questionable international information sources that promote Kremlin narratives;
- Information sources from Albania are being used to spread disinformation narratives from Serbia and Russia in Kosovo;
- Other actors, like China, have increased their output of sponsored content in the Albanian language that also targets Kosovo.

Structural problems

- The majority of media in Kosovo lack transparency regarding their funding, and sources of financing cannot be clearly identified;
- Sponsored content and content backed by external funders are not clearly labeled for readers;
- Disinformation messages from the Kremlin and its affiliated media have managed to be published in major media outlets in Kosovo through dubious channels;
- Media, including online outlets, lack clear policies for preventing and combating disinformation;
- Public institutions, including the **Assembly of Kosovo**, have failed to operationalize the **Independent Media Commission**, a key mechanism for overseeing the audiovisual and digital media sector;
- Legislation regulating media in Kosovo is not fully harmonized with European standards and European Union directives;
- Public institutions and their officials are not sufficiently prepared to deal with the phenomenon of disinformation.

CHAPTER I

THE CONTEXT OF DISINFORMATION IN KOSOVO

Within the MidWatch program, researchers from BIRN and Internews Kosova conducted an in-depth study on the context of disinformation in Kosovo. This study, the results of which were made public through five documentaries and five reports, provided a clear overview of the sources and channels used to disseminate disinformation in Kosovo after the end of the war in 1999. Interviewees provided data on the context of disinformation in the aftermath of the war.

Findings from 53 structured interviews, desk research, and analysis of media monitoring data, all collected using the same methodology since 2021, show that Kosovo has been the target of widespread disinformation campaigns aimed at undermining national security, consistently lowering trust in institutions, damaging economic development, eroding confidence in elections, and continuously provoking interethnic tensions. These disinformation campaigns have contributed to rising tensions, caused harm to individuals, and resulted in significant damage to Kosovo.

In the political sphere, the research identified two main sources that consistently sought to delegitimize electoral processes in the country.

The primary sources of disinformation were Russia and Serbia, which for a long time have disseminated narratives aimed at undermining the legitimacy of elections. As a result Serbian citizens have, in some cases, not participated in electoral processes. In the most recent elections in 2025, however, direct interference in the elections was also identified as coming from Serbia. In one case, the Special Prosecution arrested Fatmir Sheholli, who is under

investigation for publishing BIA materials in Kosovo media in order to discredit Nenad Rašić, the leader of a Serbian party who has served as a minister in the Government of Kosovo for the last two mandates.¹

The most serious challenge in the field of disinformation is in the area of national security. Over the past 26 years, several interethnic incidents have been incited by structured disinformation sources.²

Interethnic crises have been mapped as high-risk areas with strong potential for exploitation by disinformation actors.

Disinformation has also been used to radicalize segments of the Muslim community in Kosovo and to encourage young people from Kosovo to join conflicts in Syria and Iraq. Research by BIRN and Internews Kosova documented that ISIS had a clear communication strategy targeting audiences in Kosovo.³

A 2025 study by BIRN and Internews Kosova, titled “Death from Disinformation,” found that disinformation from Russia and Serbia was seriously interfering with key processes in Kosovo’s economic development.⁴

1 Fatmir Sheholli, an analyst who participated in political debates on several Albanian-language television stations in Kosovo, was arrested by the Kosovo Police on 09 October 2025 and is accused of espionage. According to the Kosovo Prosecutor’s Office, he is alleged to have acted under the instructions of Bojan Dimić, a senior official of the BIA, the Serbian Secret Service. <https://kallxo.com/lajm/dosja-e-sheholli-materialet-e-bia-s-u-publikuan-ne-mediat-online-ne-kosove/>

2 KallxoPernime. “Death from Disinformation.” 14 December 2025. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8r54A0WY9og>

3 KallxoPernime. “Death from Disinformation.” 14 December 2025. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8r54A0WY9og>

4 Kallxo.com. “The destruction of Kosovo’s economy by disinformation.” October 2025. <https://kallxo.com/lajm/shkater-rimi-i-ekonomise-se-kosoves-nga-dezinformatat/>.

At the same time, the research identified new channels and platforms for the dissemination of disinformation from Russia and China targeting the citizens of Kosovo.

Furthermore, the research identified that the media infrastructure of Kosovo is highly vulnerable to disinformation and largely non-transparent regarding its sources of funding, allowing for Russian investments in media production to achieve significant influence and securing accessible channels for dissemination in Kosovo.

While it has been documented that cash funds were allocated to pay for disinformation content, and other direct investments have been made through sponsored content, it is ultimately clear that tracing the financing of thousands of disinformation pieces is impossible due to the lack of media transparency in Kosovo and the use of cash payments.

Disinformation has found fertile ground for dissemination in the social media environment in Kosovo. For Serbian audiences, the direct influence of media controlled by authorities in Serbia is evident, as most Kosovo Serbs receive their information from sources controlled by Belgrade.⁵

On the other hand, the Albanian community in Kosovo is largely unprepared to critically assess information on social media. Poor results in the Program for International Student Assessment, PISA, confirm very low reading comprehension levels, and point to the conclusion that the public in Kosovo is more inclined to accept what they read at face value, without critical evaluation.

Studies conducted by BIRN and Internews Kosova, using structured questionnaires, have shown that citizens—and even decision-makers—often fail to distinguish between inaccurate and accurate information.

MID WATCH

MidWatch is an initiative established by three organizations: BIRN, Internews Kosova, and the Association of Journalists of Kosovo.

The outcomes of the project were as follows:

- 250 journalistic publications;
- 8 documentaries and televised debates;
- Over 80 public officials were trained;
- 15 journalists were supported with fellowships;
- 3 journalists received journalism awards.

The program's publications reached over 10 million followers on social media.

⁵ BIRN Serbia and Internews Kosova. MEDIA REPORTING ON RELATIONS BETWEEN SERBIA AND KOSOVO: CONFLICT OR COOPERATION. October. 2023

<https://internewskosova.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/Raportimi-i-mediave-mbi-marredheniet-mes-Serbise-dhe-Kosoves-Konflikt-apo-Bashkepunim-3.pdf&sa=D&source=docs&ust=1774186128909640&usg=AOvVaw1pH4syxHenu-G4UOtm14lwm>

CHAPTER II

METHODOLOGY

This report contains data from systematic monitoring conducted during the period September 2025 – February 2026.

During the preparation of this report, the authors analyzed online content and traditional media with the aim of identifying hate speech and disinformation narratives targeting democratic institutions, Kosovo's EU and NATO integration processes, ethnic and religious divisions. A particular focus of this report were gender-based disinformation and disinformation during electoral campaigns.

Four Kremlin-controlled media outlets were selected⁶ as the sampling frame for this content analysis, all of which combined produced 1,323 news items about Kosovo during the monitoring period.

To facilitate data collection, the research team defined several key phrases, which were then used to extract data from 150 online platforms in Kosovo, where disinformation content was identified. The team identified over 20,000 suspicious links produced during this period, while 2,361 articles were selected for in-depth analysis.

During the monitoring period, researchers also mapped content on social media. Using **Meta's Content Library** platform,⁷ as well as other platforms like TikTok, researchers identified approximately 1,100 false pieces of content distributed across Meta, TikTok, and Telegram.

This study also tracked the financing of disinformation.

To identify funding sources for media outlets and disinformation campaigns, the team analyzed open data from institutions, publicly available data from social media platforms, and accessible media reports. To track the dissemination of propaganda for political parties in the media, the team also analyzed the republication of sponsored announcements during the election campaign.

To assess whether information was false or contained disinformation, evaluations conducted by fact-checkers in Kosovo and the region were used, while the definition of what constitutes disinformation was primarily based on prior assessments by the **EUvsDisinfo** platform.⁸

Based on these clearly defined methodological criteria, the team identified sources and channels of disinformation dissemination. Using a questionnaire with over 80 institutional officials, the team assessed the readiness of state institutions to deal with disinformation. Additionally, the team conducted over 53 interviews with experts from Serbia, Albania, and Kosovo, aiming to provide a broader understanding of the disinformation context in the region.

6 [Russia Today Balkan](#); [Sputnikportal.rs](#); [Pravda](#); [Russian News Agency](#)

7 Meta Content Library is a platform that enables researchers to explore and understand data through Facebook and Instagram, offering a comprehensive, visual, and searchable collection of public content. <https://developers.facebook.com/docs/content-library-and-api>.

8 EUvsDisinfo is a platform of the East StratCom Task Force, bringing together a team of experts with experience primarily in communications, journalism, social sciences, and Russian studies. <https://euvsdisinfo.eu/>.

On average, 7.1 articles about Kosovo per day were produced by Russian-controlled media.

On average, 6 fake news items in Albanian are published daily on social media. These reach millions of views.

MAPPING OF DISINFORMATION CHANNELS

Contaminated information related to Kosovo is presented to the public using various communication techniques and channels.

Who Produces Fake News?

Undoubtedly, the most dangerous sources of disinformation are platforms controlled by Russian⁹ and Serbian sources, however Chinese sources should also be taken into consideration.¹⁰ These governments publish disinformation content about Kosovo, the region, and the world on a daily basis. This research identified hundreds of cases in which articles from Sputnik, Russia Today, Pravda, TASS, or Radio Ejani were published in online media in Kosovo without any editing.

Content produced by these platforms is then amplified through online platforms in the local language and reaches the public without being identified as originating from Russian, Serbian, or Chinese sources.

What Are the Sources of Information?

Due to language and regional specificities, the citizens of Kosovo are directly influenced by information sources from Serbia and Albania.

In specific cases, such as the disinformation surrounding the Banjska attack in September 2023, researchers found that sources from Albania also attempted to misinform domestic audiences. Disinformation from Albania is later republished in Kosovo media. For Kosovo Serbs, most information comes from Serbia-based media, which have been identified as sources of disinformation. Within Kosovo, local Serbian-language media lack sufficient capacity to fully

cover current events.

Sources Contaminated by International Media

In public discourse, citizens are prone to believe international media are professional and free from disinformation. However, detailed analysis of translations into Albanian and Serbian revealed that in some cases content was manipulated—removing neutral positions from the content and presenting only Russian disinformation narratives. This is a newly identified technique, particularly used in translations into Albanian and Serbian.

Sponsored Materials

In most cases, the media in Kosovo conceal information about sponsored content. This is especially evident during elections, when political parties' statements are published without editing. Hidden sponsorship is also identified in disinformation related to health and the economy.

Influencers as Disinformation Sources

Beyond traditional sources of disinformation, the research found that influencers, conspiracy theorists, politicians, and other individuals with large audiences often become sources of disinformation.

⁹ [Russia Today Balkan](#); [Sputnikportal.rs](#); [Pravda](#); [Russian News Agency](#)

¹⁰ [Radio Ejani](#); [albanian.cri.cn](#)

In certain cases, influencers are particularly dangerous, especially when they discuss security incidents and interethnic events.

Transmission Channels

Content analysis showed that most media are vulnerable to disinformation, while its dissemination occurs through various channels. The most dangerous disinformation is produced and spread by state actors, whom citizens tend to trust.

In the Western Balkans region, issues with the accuracy of content in politicians' speeches are observed.¹¹ These narratives are also disseminated through official government channels and politicians' official websites. Beyond these channels, social media platforms are the most common spaces where disinformation is spread and reaches audiences.

In Kosovo, television stations generally apply better fact-checking filters; however, in certain cases, conspiracy theorists and unverified sources are given space, often presented as analysts or experts.

Use of Artificial Intelligence

Technological development and the use of Artificial Intelligence (AI) have made disinformation production easier. Researchers found that AI was used in over 40% of identified disinformation cases, mainly for manipulating videos and images.¹²

Who Finances It?

The Tax Administration of Kosovo does not disclose the number of employees working in registered media businesses. The Pikasa platform¹³ identified 150 online outlets in Kosovo, publishing 4,500 news items per day on average.¹⁴ Producing this volume of content requires large editorial and journalistic teams. Funding sources for these platforms are nearly impossible to trace using public and open data.

In online searches, most online media that have websites do not disclose their number of staff and the names of journalists.

Investigations by the Kosovo Special Prosecutor's Office led to the arrest of analyst Fatmir Sheholli, who was allegedly tasked with planting information in Kosovo media for the Serbian Intelligence Service, BIA, with the aim of discrediting Serbian politicians who cooperate with the Government of Kosovo, and to disseminate other narratives considered important by the BIA.¹⁵

Another challenge in tracking disinformation financing is that social media platforms do not properly recognize the Albanian language. Meta and TikTok do not allow monetization of content in Albanian. As a result, most platforms targeting the Kosovo market operate from abroad, with pages registered in Germany, France, the United States and elsewhere.

According to the Pikasa platform, more than 35,000 posts are published daily on social media for the Kosovo market. This volume generates significant revenue from social media advertising.

At the regional and global level, it is not possible to determine the value of investments made by Chinese, Serbian and Russian state media into Albanian- and Serbian-language content, the majority of which is disinformation about Kosovo.

11 [https://www.google.com/url?q=https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2020/653621/EXPO_STU\(2020\)653621_EN.pdf&sa=D&source=docs&ust=1774274497209099&usg=AOvVaw3VrTzTGwsaBQOrItvpEsw3](https://www.google.com/url?q=https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2020/653621/EXPO_STU(2020)653621_EN.pdf&sa=D&source=docs&ust=1774274497209099&usg=AOvVaw3VrTzTGwsaBQOrItvpEsw3)

12 Prishtina Insight. "Përbajtja e gjeneruar nga Inteligjenca Artificiale kërcënon besueshmërinë e informacionit në Kosovë." Gusht 2025. <https://prishtinainsight.com/ai-generated-content-threaten-information-credibility-in-kosovo-mag/>.

13 [Pikasa](https://pikasa.ai/) is an international platform that monitors online media and social networks. It monitors and analyzes 150 media and social network platforms in Kosovo, using Artificial Intelligence to provide comprehensive data.

14 [Pikasa](https://pikasa.ai/) was established by Norik Selimi in North Macedonia. It provides AI-based real-time analysis for 28 regions, analyzing media and social platforms, while making sure it is compliant with the General Regulation on Data Protection. It monitors and analyses 150 media and social network platforms in Kosovo, using AI to provide extensive data. <https://pikasa.ai/>

15 BIA materials published in online media in Kosovo: <https://kallxo.com/lajm/dosja-e-sheholli-materialet-e-bia-s-u-publikuan-ne-mediat-online-ne-kosove/>

HYBRID THREATS TO SECURITY

Hybrid warfare and the threats that come with it are among the main tools used by authoritarian states and non-state actors. This type of threat combines a range of methods, including false alarms, cyberattacks, economic pressure, and covert political moves. Alongside these, disinformation is also part of hybrid warfare, used deliberately to manipulate society and weaken trust in democratic institutions.

In recent years, Kosovo has been continuously exposed to different forms of hybrid threats.

This range of actions has included unconfirmed armed incidents¹⁶, false bomb threats¹⁷, flights of unidentified drones, as well as direct attacks on critical infrastructure¹⁸, along with messages claiming the presence of certain groups on the ground.

Researchers also noted cases where disinformation was used to support hybrid operations aimed at increasing insecurity in Kosovo and the surrounding region.

The main sources of this kind of disinformation are clearly linked to the Kremlin and Serbia, although in certain cases, religious-based disinformation has also played a role in spreading fear and panic.

Hybrid Disinformation on Attacks and Territorial Disputes

During the monitoring period, researchers observed a trend of unverified reporting by Serbian media, describing incidents where Albanian groups were framed negatively. These incidents were never confirmed as having happened by either Serbian or Kosovo authorities. At the same time, inside Kosovo, platforms like Telegram were used to disseminate false reports of violence. The country also faced bomb threats and reports of unidentified drones near areas with critical infrastructure.

On 16 November 2025, [Serbian Radio and Television \(archive\)](#) reported that, “a group of masked Albanians attacked members of the Serbian Armed Forces” near the ‘Debela Glava’ base.¹⁹ The report, based on unofficial sources, claimed that the group fired 15 gunshots at Serbian soldiers, hitting only a dog that was near the patrol.

16 Krypometër. “Photo manipulation: Kosovo Police falsely linked to shots fired in Serbia’s territory.” January 2026. <https://kallxo.com/krypometer/manipulim-me-fotografi-policia-e-kosoves-nderlidhet-rrejshem-me-te-shtenat-ne-territorin-e-serbise/>.

17 False bomb alarm in a school in Fushë-Kosovë; <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=G1Nmh7afhx8>

18 Explosion in the ‘Ibër Lepenc’ canal; <https://kallxo.com/lajm/shperthimi-ne-kanalin-e-iber-lepencit-aktakuze-ndaj-tre-personave/>

19 RTS. “A group of Albanians shot at members of the Serbian Armed Forces near ‘Debela Glava’ base.” November 2025. <https://www.rts.rs/lat/vesti/politika/5828341/grupa-albanaca-pucala-na-pripadnike-vojske-srbije-kod-baze-debela-glava.html>; <https://archive.ph/oP3EV> .

The article claimed that an armed group using “six SUV’s left in the direction of Kosovo.” The content was republished in several outlets (see [here/archive](#),²⁰ [here/archive](#)²¹ and [here/archive](#)²²), however it was not confirmed by Serbia’s Ministry of Internal Affairs or Ministry of Defense. The same content was used by [Kremlin support-groups](#) to [exaggerate and disseminate](#) the same false narrative.²³

[Televizioni N1 \(archive\)](#) reported that state institutions (Ministry of Internal Affairs, Ministry of Defense, and the Serbian Police) had not provided any information on the alleged incident.²⁴

Fact-checkers identified another [report](#)²⁵ that was [false](#)²⁶ published on the [serbian.times](#) Instagram,

which holds Kosovo Police accountable for the attack in Serbia. This post, made on January 14, 2025, falsely claimed that Kosovo Police had carried out an armed assault in Serbia.

In the same vein, fact-checkers determined that on February 27, 2026 some of the main media outlets in Serbia (see [k1info.rs/arkiva](#)²⁷, [novosti.](#)

[rs/arkiva](#)²⁸ and [b92.net/archive](#)²⁹) reported that Serbian Police had been assaulted by Albanians in the Madljika region, and the attackers had fled in the direction of Kosovo. So far, no one from the Serbian police has confirmed the incident occurred, let alone that the attackers were Albanians.

Another attack in the Madljika region was claimed to have taken place on [02 March 2026](#)³⁰ around 13:00. The news was also covered by the [Kosovo-Online](#) portal, who cited [the Serbian outlet Telegraf \(archive\)](#)³¹ in their article. Even in the original report, no evidence was provided to support the claim that the attackers were Albanians; instead, it was suggested that such incidents may be linked to illegal logging groups or aimed at destabilizing the situation along the border line.

In Kosovo, several media reported on the Kosovo government’s accusations that the Serbian gendarmerie carried out an attack on [November 11, 2025](#),³² resulting in the wounding of a Serbian citizen from Leposavic. The same claims were also made by the Minister of Internal Affairs, Xhelal Sveçla, in a post on his Facebook profile on 03 November 2025.

20 Blic. “This is the exact location where shots were fired toward members of the Serbian Army: Albanians left using six SUV’s.” November 2025. [Ovo je tačna lokacija na kojoj su Albanci pucali na pripadnike Vojske Srbije - Blic](#) and [https://archive.ph/](#)

21 Pepo Politika, Facebook post. “A group of Albanians shot at members of the Serbian Armed Forces near ‘Debela Glava’ base.” [https://www.facebook.com/100067050860821/posts/maskirana-grupa-albanaca-napala-je-pripadnike-vojske-srbije-danas-oko-15-%C4%8Dasova-/1161407116104306/](#); and [https://archive.ph/3dQba](#)

22 Beraneonline, Instagram post. “RTS: ‘A group of Albanians shot at members of the Serbian Armed Forces near ‘Debela Glava’ base in Bujanovac.’” [https://www.instagram.com/p/DRImKESjHsu/](#); [https://archive.ph/6lpdf](#).

23 Obavesti me, a Youtube channel publishing political news and comments from the Balkans, often employing highly dramatic headlines to get clicks. [https://www.youtube.com/@obavestime](#); Obavesti me, Youtube video. “Who shot at Serbian soldiers? The truth from the ground.” [Ko je zapucao na srpske vojnike? Istina sa terena?](#)

24 Television N1. “Two cases in three months: Even the municipal administration of Bujanovas has no information as to what exactly happened near the ‘Debela Glava’ base.” January 2026. [https://n1info.rs/vesti/opstina-bujanovac-informacija-pucnjava-debela-glava-kosovo/](#); [https://archive.ph/RujdY](#).

25 Serbian.times. “Albanians opened fire on Serbian Police: Drama on the border, backup forces dispatched.” [https://www.instagram.com/p/DTg4c8KgQ9t/](#); [https://archive.ph/VUWlc](#).

26 Krypometër. “Photo manipulation: Kosovo Police falsely linked to shots fired in Serbia’s territory.” January 2026. [https://kallxo.com/krypometer/manipulim-me-fotografi-policia-e-kosoves-nderlidhet-rrejshem-me-te-shtenat-ne-territorin-e-serbise/](#).

27 K1 info. “Albanians attacked Serbian police in Kosovo and Metohija, an incident on the Ground Safety Zone.” [https://www.k1info.rs/vesti/politika/122094/albanici-napali-srpsku-policiju/vest](#); and [albanici napali srpsku policiju](#).

28 Novosti. “An Albanian attacked Serbian police in the Ground Safety Zone.” [https://www.novosti.rs/vesti/politika/1579787/siptari-napali-srpsku-policiju-kopnenoj-zoni-bezbednosti](#); and [https://archive.ph/ExCPU](#).

29 B92. “Albanians attacked Serbian police in the Ground Safety Zone: They set an ambush on the road and shot 10 rounds.” [https://www.b92.net/info/politika/211202/albanici-napali-srpsku-policiju-u-kopnenoj-zoni-bezbednosti-postavili-prepreku-na-putu-pa-ispalili-10-metaka/vest](#); and [https://archive.ph/cOYoK](#).

30 Kosovo-online. “Another armed assault against Serbian police at the Ground Safety Zone.” [https://www.kosovo-online.com/vesti/politika/novi-oruzani-napad-na-srpsku-policiju-u-kopnenoj-zoni-bezbednosti-2-3-2026](#).

31 Telegraf. “Another armed assault against Serbian police at the Ground Safety Zone: Albanians fired shots at Serbian Police in the Madljika region.” [https://www.telegraf.rs/vesti/hronika/4281664-novi-oruzani-napad-u-kopnenoj-zoni-bezbednosti-albanici-pucali-na-srpsku-policiju-u-reonu-madljike](#);

32 News published in several media with the title: “Suspicious that Serbian gendarmerie entered Kosovo, wounded and kidnapped a citizen in Leposaviq”; see [here](#)

International authorities have not confirmed whether this event took place within Kosovo's territory in Serbia.³³

The [381.6 kilometer](#)³⁴ border with Serbia is the longest border Kosovo shares with any of its neighbors. This border area is marked by frequent crime and smuggling. Interventions by authorities to arrest dangerous criminals are often accompanied by tensions and disinformation that fuel fears of conflict.

A joint operation by KFOR and the Serbian gendarmerie to arrest illegal loggers was reported in Albanian-language media as a violation of Kosovo's territorial integrity.

On 15 December 2025, the Facebook page [Pozitivnasrpska.com](#) shared a [video](#) titled: "Albanians in a panic, Serbian forces enter Kosovo! It has begun."³⁵ The same content was also shared on TikTok, increasing its reach and impact. [Fact-checking](#)³⁶ ([archive](#)) showed that the images used in the video had been circulating online since [December 2022](#) and were not related to any new developments in Kosovo.³⁷

Serbian media reported that the then Minister of Internal Affairs of Serbia had visited the gendarmerie base in Kraljevo, at a time when the situation in northern Kosovo was tense due to barricades set up by local Serbs in

2022. However, these developments were [misinterpreted](#) by the page [Pozitivnasrpska.com](#) and presented in a [manipulative](#) way, to make it seem as though Serbian forces had entered Kosovo to occupy it.³⁸

Disinformation is not limited to security issues, it also extends to the misinterpretation of international political developments. A video from Euronews Albania, shared on [TikTok](#) ([archive](#)), claimed that the U.S. Congress had taken control of Presheva.³⁹ In reality, the U.S. Congress discussed and advanced [a bill](#) calling for official reporting on the treatment of ethnic minorities in Serbia, with particular focus on Albanians in the Presheva Valley.⁴⁰ This kind of distortion is meant to create confusion and false expectations, playing on public emotions.

Another example is the spread of a photo on [TikTok](#)⁴¹ claiming that Kosovo's Prime Minister, Albin Kurti, was having dinner with Serbia's President, Aleksandar Vučić. The image was actually from an official meeting in Brussels in 2023, within the Kosovo–Serbia dialogue, with EU mediators in attendance. Presenting it as a "private dinner" and suggesting that the "Zajednica (Association of Serb Municipalities) is happening" is meant to mislead and provoke emotional reactions.

33 Telegrafi.com. "KFOR Responds Following the Abduction of a Kosovo Citizen at the Border by the Serbian Gendarmerie." 3 November 2025. <https://telegrafi.com/kfor-i-deklarohet-per-pas-rrembimit-te-serbit-ne-kufi-nga-xhandarmeria-serbe/>

34 Kosovo Agency of Statistics. Statistical Yearbook of the Republic of Kosovo 2025. <https://askapi.rks-gov.net/Custom/19d-9c9c5-5ce7-4e49-b968-10bddfbc9e39.pdf>.

35 Pozitivnasrpska.com, Facebook post. "Albanians in a panic, Serbian forces enter Kosovo! It has begun" <https://www.facebook.com/100067404364022/posts/dramati%C4%8Dnopogledajte-na-httpspozitivnasrpskacomalban-ci-tvrde-da-su-srpska-vojska/1182793583977443/>.

36 "The pathway of disinformation that raises interethnic tensions in Kosovo" From Telegram groups to Russian media." January 2026. <https://kallxo.com/gjate/rrugetimi-i-dezinformimit-qe-nxit-tensione-nderetnike-ne-kosove-nga-grupet-e-telegramit-te-mediat-ruse>

37 Tanjug. "Gashic visited a unit of the gendarmerie in the town of Kraljevo." <https://archive.ph/19LVd#selection-1121.33-1121.75>

38 Pozitivnasrpska.com, Facebook post. "Albanians in panic, Serbian forces enter Kosovo! It has begun!" <https://www.facebook.com/100067404364022/posts/dramati%C4%8Dnopogledajte-na-httpspozitivnasrpskacomalban-ci-tvrde-da-su-srpska-vojska/1182793583977443/>; and "The pathway of disinformation that raises interethnic tensions in Kosovo: From Telegram groups to Russian media." January 2026. <https://kallxo.com/gjate/rrugetimi-i-dezinformimit-qe-nxit-tensione-nderetnike-ne-kosove-nga-grupet-e-telegramit-te-mediat-ruse>

39 "Serbia in shock! American congress takes control of Presevo." TikTok post. <https://www.tiktok.com/@bajrush.kurti0/video/7598173447042125078?r=1&t=ZS-93HpcbU633w>.

40 United States Congress. "H.R.6411 – Law on Assessment of Discrimination in Presevo Valley." March 2025. <https://www.congress.gov/bill/119th-congress/house-bill/6411/text>.

41 Tiktok post. <https://www.tiktok.com/@apple.user7767940/video/7567104121430478091?lang=en>.

Disinformation Narratives Around the Trilateral Defense Agreement

A trilateral defense agreement between Albania, Croatia, and Kosovo was used as a pretext for spreading coordinated disinformation narratives by the Government of Serbia, the Kremlin, and several Serbian media outlets. This technical security cooperation was framed as a threat to regional stability.

In their official statements, Serbia and Russia portrayed the agreement in dramatic terms, calling it a “pact against Serbia.” Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić claimed that Albania and Croatia had entered an “arms race,” while Russian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Maria Zakharova described the agreement as a “[false pretext](#)” ([archive](#)) for escalating tensions in the Balkans, in the interest of Western powers.⁴²

Vučić also used the agreement as [justification and pretense](#) ([archive](#))⁴³ for increasing Serbia’s defense investments. This narrative was further amplified by several Serbian-language media outlets. The portal Kurir.rs referred to Kosovo as the “so-called Kosovo” and used phrases like “pact against Serbia,” “alliance directed against Serbian interests,” and “threat to regional stability.” The same article was republished by other outlets, including [Borba.me](#),⁴⁴ and [Novosti.rs](#).⁴⁵ After reporting by KALLXO.com, Kurir.rs

removed the false claims from the article, but other media did not make corrections.

This narrative began circulating after the signing of the [Trilateral Joint Declaration](#) ([archive](#)),⁴⁶ on 18 March 2025 by the defense ministers of Albania, Croatia, and Kosovo. The document focuses on increasing interoperability through joint exercises and training, cooperation between defense industries, and addressing hybrid threats, including cyberattacks and disinformation. [The statement](#) ([archive](#)) also emphasizes support for Kosovo’s Euro-Atlantic integration and coordination with NATO and EU structures, without creating new legal obligations.⁴⁷

Croatian Prime Minister Andrej Plenković [stated](#) that he had clarified to Vučić during a meeting in New Delhi that the cooperation is technical and not directed against Serbia.⁴⁸ Similarly, Kosovo’s Minister of Defense, Ejup Maqedonci, [stressed](#) that the agreement focuses on training cooperation and addressing shared risks, and is not aimed at any specific actor in the region.⁴⁹

Fear of Unidentified Drones

Various media⁵⁰ have reported on unidentified drones flying over police stations, [military bases](#) ([archive](#))⁵¹ and even NATO facilities in Kosovo (see [here/archive](#), [here/archive](#) and [here/archive](#)).⁵²

42 Russian Federation Ministry of Foreign Affairs. “Briefing by Ministry of Foreign Affairs Spokesperson, Maria Zakharova, Moscow.” September 18, 2025. https://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/2047632/; <https://archive.ph/Ejn0K>.

43 Portar.hr. “The biggest threat to Vucic is a “military allegiance” of Croatia, Albania and Kosovo.” February 2026. https://www.portal.hr/en/novosti/hr/105081-vucicu-najveca-prijetnja-vojni-savez-hrvatske-albanije-i-kosova?#google_vignett; <https://archive.ph/WlmgT>.

44 Borba.me. “Pact against Serbia! A trilateral meeting was held in Shkodra between Albania, Croatia and Prishtina for military cooperation.” February 2026. <https://borba.me/pakt-protiv-srbije-u-skadru-poceo-trilateralni-sastanak-albanije-hrvatske-i-pristine-o-vojnoj-saradnji/>.

45 Novosti.rs. “New threats and dangers for Serbia! An urgent notification from the Ministry of Defense about the meeting between Zagreb, Pristina and Tirana.” September 2026. <https://www.novosti.rs/vesti/politika/1574524/nove-pretnje-opasnosti-srbiju-hitno-saopstenje-ministarstva-odbrane-povodom-sastanka-zagreba-pristine-tirane>;

46 The trilateral joint statement Kosovo-Croatia-Albania, after the meeting March 18, 2025. <https://www.mod.gov.al/images/PDF/2025/ALB-CRO-KOS-joint-declaration.pdf>; archive.ph/4TnfO.

47 Ibid.

48 “Disinformation narratives around the trilateral agreement between Kosovo-Croatia-Albania”. February 2026. <https://kallxo.com/gjate/narrativat-dezinformuese-rreth-marreshjes-tripaleshe-kosove-kroaci-shqiperi/>.

49 Ibid.

50 See media reports on suspicious drones in Kosovo: <https://archive.ph/a1i86>

51 Facebook post. Exclusive: Serbia flies drone over military base in Dumos <https://archive.ph/YB5lj>.

52 IndeksOnline. “KFOR: We have not identified any drone flying violations.” February 2025. <https://indeksonline.net/%E2%80%8Bkfor-nuk-kemi-identifikuar-shkelje-te-fluturimit-te-droneve/>; <https://archive.ph/7MSZg>; RTV Malisheva. “Drones from Serbia violate Kosovo’s airspace in Kamenica.” January 2026. <https://www.facebook.com/RTVM2001/posts/pfbid0LiPs1KWcjNa69sK2VH7Pn7MBbsCKGkppHXvWkiPVGioyZ8kqSmHcDboSjXgh8gl>; <https://archive.ph/9Sc0E>; RTV Dukagjini. “Suspensions of Serbian drones in Kosovo – KFOR and police intensify monitoring.” August 2025. <https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=741528198872118>; <https://archive.ph/UUlix>.

NATO stated that it had not identified any “dangerous drones,” without clarifying what kind of drones were involved (see [here](#)).⁵³ Meanwhile, the Kosovo Police said: “We have had drone flights, which we suspect are coming into the northern part of Kosovo from the Serbian territory.” (see [here/archive](#),⁵⁴ [here](#)⁵⁵ and [here/archive](#)⁵⁶).

These statements were later used to spread disinformation claiming that the Kosovo Security Force (KSF) had been mobilized after suspicious drones were spotted. An article published by [Rajoni.org](#) with the headline: “**EXCLUSIVE: Suspicious drones in the north, KSF on alert – soldiers called to barracks**” ([archive](#)),⁵⁷ was shared in a coordinated way across 11 Facebook pages (see [Fshatrat e Drenicës/archive](#),⁵⁸ [Gazeta Imazhi/archive](#),⁵⁹ [Busulla e Jetes/archive](#),⁶⁰ [Live Gjilani.com/archive](#),⁶¹ [Vushtrria qyteti antik/archive](#),⁶² [Mendim.al/archive](#),⁶³ [Network Mitrovica 1/archive](#),⁶⁴ [Zeri i Mergates/archive](#)⁶⁵). The content generated anxiety and attracted significant public attention. Data from Meta platforms showed that the post received 420 comments and was shared by 47 profiles on Facebook. However, the claims that the KSF had mobilised in response to drone sightings were false and the KSF [clarified](#) that it was a pre-planned exercise.⁶⁶

Suspicious drones flying near critical infrastructure, including airports, have also been reported in several European countries. In some cases, airports in Germany, Norway, Poland, and

the Netherlands were temporarily shut down due to unidentified drones.

Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen [described](#) ([archive](#)) the presence of drones at airports as the “most serious attack on Danish critical infrastructure to date.”⁶⁷ She added that a possible hybrid attack was under investigation, without ruling out Russian involvement. On the other hand, Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov denied any connection, calling the claims “baseless accusations.”

Exaggerating the Security Risks of Drone Purchases

Kremlin-controlled media also pushed disinformation and alarmist narratives after the Ministry of Defense announced, on 08 October 2025, that Kosovo had received thousands of combat drones from Turkey.

The [Pravda network](#) ([archive](#)) portrayed this as an expansion of Turkish influence into the Balkans, using Kosovo as a proxy.⁶⁸ The issue of drones was used to push Russian propaganda that Turkey and the United States are arming Kosovo against Serbia. At the same time, [Sputnik Serbia](#) ([archive](#)) framed Turkey’s support for Kosovo as illegal armament, claiming that such actions “cause unrest and threaten the safety and daily life of the Serbian population.”⁶⁹

53 IndeksOnline. “KFOR: We have not identified any drone flying violations.” February 2025. <https://indeksonline.net/%E2%80%8Bkfor-nuk-kemi-identifikuar-shkelje-te-fluturimit-te-droneve/>; <https://archive.ph/7MSZg>.

54 RTV Dukagjini. “Hoxha: Suspicious drones from Serbia have flown in the north of Kosovo. Police is coordinating matters with KFOR.” February 2025. <https://www.facebook.com/dukagjiniirtv/posts/pfbid0QPMYuksptbLvd96MJqtyBfK4xsK2af79G5CeG4CfDJeQoBAAASc1oVDQspgT948I>; <https://archive.ph/8M5q9>.

55 Klan Kosova. “Provocations” at the border - Police has spotted Serbian drones at the border, KFOR has not.” September 2025. <https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=1092989259485997>.

56 Kanal 10. February 2025. <https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=1347915937027754>; <https://archive.ph/ia2xo>.

57 Rajoni. “EXCLUSIVE: Suspicions of drones in the North, KSF on alert – calls soldiers to barracks.” February 2025. <https://www.facebook.com/Rajonii.org/posts/pfbid0aYfjcEgEZULSoMvbyuo9wmw6tp93EZK Z9847kmYo8Ptxm79VGEAEPOSH-9pHXykMI>; and <https://archive.ph/1qoUQ>.

58 Fshatrat e Drenicës, Facebook post. <https://archive.ph/so5K9>.

59 Gazeta Imazhi, Facebook post. <https://archive.ph/b9lr2>.

60 Busulla e Jetës, Facebook post. <https://archive.ph/q3HF6>

61 LiveGjilani.com, Facebook post. <https://archive.ph/SML6Q>

62 Vushtrria qyteti antik, Facebook post. <https://archive.ph/xjFKg>;

63 Mendim.al, Facebook post. <https://archive.ph/aOkmZ>;

64 Network Mitrovica 1, Facebook group post. <https://archive.ph/Qoi06>;

65 Zeri i mërgatës, Facebook post. <https://archive.ph/uVCEw>

66 “Contradicting reports on drones and KSF mobilization”. Kallxo.com. September 2025. <https://kallxo.com/lajm/fact-check-lajm/raportimet-kontradiktore-per-drone-e-mobilizim-te-fsk-se/>.

67 DW. “Danish government describes drones at the airport as “assault”.” September 2025. <https://www.dw.com/sq/qeve-ria-daneze-i-quan-dron%C3%ABt-n%C3%AB-aeroporte-sulm/a-74110824>.

68 Pravda. “Turkish birds over “Kosovo”. September 2025. <https://albania.news-pravda.com/world/2025/10/08/4576.html>

69 Sputnik. “Illegal armament of the so-called KBS in front of KFOR’s eyes: Mojsilovic had an important conversa-

Also, [Russia Today Balkan \(archive\)](#), links the delivery of “more than 1,000 drones” to the military agreement between Kosovo, Croatia, and Albania, signed in March 2025, which focuses on the exchange of personnel and on strengthening the defense industry.⁷⁰ The agreement’s signatories stated that the initiative is open and may include other countries. Russia Today claimed, without any substantiating evidence, that the main supplier of weapons to these parties is Turkey.

However, the process of arming the Kosovo Security Force is being carried out in accordance with the Laws Approved by the Kosovo Assembly (see [here](#)⁷¹ and [here](#)⁷²) and based on the [10-year transformation plan \(archive\)](#).⁷³ In a [communication](#) issued on 10 October 2025, Kosovo’s Ministry of Defense thanked the manufacturer “Skydagger” for the record-breaking delivery of the drones purchased by this ministry.⁷⁴

During monitoring of Telegram groups, hundreds of messages were identified which portray the Kosovo Police as aggressive, particularly police in the northern region. In one case, fact-checkers found that a report claiming a local Serb had been beaten by police was false. The individual in question—a young man from the Serbian community in Kosovo—is now being prosecuted for false reporting, after footage showed that the police had not used force and that his injuries were sustained during a visit to the ski slopes.

tion.” <https://lat.sputnikportal.rs/20251010/nelegalno-naoruzavanje-tzv-kbs-pred-ocima-kfor-a-mojisi-ovic-obavio-vazan-razgovor--1191239900.html>.

70 RT Balkan. “Turkey slaps Serbia: “Will it hand over ballistic missiles to Pristina after the drones?” October 2025. <https://rt.rs/srbija-i-balkan/159584-turska-samar-srbiji-dronovi/>.

71 Law No. 03/L-045 on the Ministry for the Kosovo Security Force. <https://mod.rks-gov.net/desk/inc/media/4603a605-1f52-4adb-b2ab-b8d45a9ee79f.pdf>.

72 Law No. 03/L-046 on the Kosovo Security Force. <https://mod.rks-gov.net/desk/inc/media/bbf60383-a620-49d1-abb0-0884e8dfff0c.pdf>.

73 Koha.mk. “KSF in line with the army transformation plan.” January 2024. <https://koha.mk/en/fsk-ne-hap-me-planin-per-transformim-ne-ushtri/>.

74 Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Kosovo. Communication, October 10, 2025. <https://www.facebook.com/share/p/1CbCEGExj3/>.

CONTAMINATION OF THE MEDIA SPACE BY THE KREMLIN

Flooding audiences with fabricated information and then redistributing it through local media is one of the main techniques the Kremlin uses to spread disinformation narratives in crisis regions, including Kosovo.

The main regionally active media outlets controlled by the Kremlin are: Sputnik Serbia, Russia Today Balkan, the Pravda network, and TASS (the Russian News Agency). These outlets were monitored from 1 September 2025 to 1 March 2026 (181 days), focusing only on articles that mention Kosovo.

During this period, the four Kremlin-controlled outlets published 1,323 articles about Kosovo, averaging 7.3 articles per day. Monitoring was divided into two periods. In the first two months (September 2025 – October 2025), these four media outlets published an average of 6.3 articles per day. While, in the second period (01 November 2025 – 01 March 2026), the rate increased, reaching an average of 7.7 articles published per day.

In most of these articles, disinformation identified was related to Kosovo and its political status, and in some cases even false information about the events being reported.

The Sputnik media network, based in Serbia, published the largest number of articles during this period (1 September 2025 – 1 March 2026). This media outlet, controlled and financed directly by the Kremlin, published 628 articles about Kosovo, or an average of 3.4 articles per day. Following Sputnik is Russia Today Balkan, which published 526 articles about Kosovo, or an average of 2.9 articles per day. Meanwhile, the

Russian propaganda network Pravda, [known for spreading disinformation](#)⁷⁵ in over 80 countries around the world and in dozens of different languages, published 140 articles about Kosovo in the Albanian language. TASS (Russian News Agency) published 29 articles about Kosovo.

In total, these Kremlin media satellites have published 1,323 articles, or about 7.3 articles per day.

According to the EU's East StratCom Task Force ([EEAS East StratCom Task Force](#)), this flooding of the media space is part of the [Kremlin's newest strategy](#)⁷⁶ to overwhelm the internet with repeated AI-amplified content. [EUvsDisinfo](#)⁷⁷ says that there has been a shift from producing fake news to overpopulating the internet with information reproduced through Large Language Models (LLM), as many users are now replacing Google search with Artificial Intelligence tools. By overpopulating the internet with disinformation articles, the Kremlin is aiming to '[corrupt](#)' Artificial Intelligence infrastructure in order to ensure that the responses provided by various AI and Chatbots are in line with Kremlin policies.

Even [the French government agency Viginum](#)⁷⁸ has written about the disinformation network 'Pravda,' which aims to manipulate Artificial Intelligence and spread the false and misleading claims produced by Russian state media.

75 EUvsDisinfo. <https://euvsdisinfo.eu/?s=pravda>.

76 EUvsDisinfo. Large language patterns: the new battlefield of Russian information warfare. October 2025. <https://euvsdisinfo.eu/large-language-models-the-new-battlefield-of-russian-information-warfare/>.

77 Ibid.

78 French government agency Viginum (2024). "Portal Kombat: A structured and coordinated pro-Russian propaganda network. Technical report." https://www.sgdsn.gouv.fr/files/files/20240212_NP_SGDSN_VIGINUM_PORTAL-KOMBAT-NET-WORK_ENG_VF.pdf.

EUvsDisinfo identified that the Kremlin aims to overwhelm the internet with fake information by training Large Language Models (LLM) to reproduce manipulative narratives and disinformation, a strategy that is being dubbed [LLM grooming](#).⁷⁹

The Path of Disinformation: From Telegram Groups to the Pravda Network

The “Pravda” Propaganda Network published 140 articles in Albanian during the monitoring period. Many of Pravda’s articles are also translated into other languages, as it operates in 83 countries. News related to Kosovo that is published in other languages often has different content from that on the Albanian-language site: [albania.news-pravda.com](#).⁸⁰

After analyzing 140 articles published in Pravda, it was found that all the articles use various Telegram groups as sources of information.

The articles are typically a mix of news and opinions. They usually begin with reporting on a real event in Kosovo or the surrounding area, and then include added commentary from Telegram group administrators, which is presented as part of the article. These pieces are considered disinformation because they draw false conclusions about the political situation and include misleading interpretations of events. In addition, nearly every Pravda article reflects Kremlin-aligned narratives, often combined with even more extreme conspiratorial claims.

There are several groups that have been identified as sources of disinformation in Albanian for the Pravda network, such as: [balkanar](#) ([archive](#)),⁸¹ [balkan_pro](#),⁸² [rentv_news](#),⁸³ [MID_Russia](#),⁸⁴ [tass_world](#),⁸⁵ [baltnews](#),⁸⁶ [infantmilitario](#),⁸⁷ [warhistoryalconafter](#),⁸⁸ [zvezdanews](#),⁸⁹ [ukr_2025_ru](#),⁹⁰ [dress2](#),⁹¹ [belarusian_silovik](#),⁹² [boris_rozhin](#),⁹³ [Politnavigator](#),⁹⁴ [ruptlyalert](#),⁹⁵ [balkanossiper](#),⁹⁶ [historiographe](#),⁹⁷ [radio_sputnik](#),⁹⁸ [darkzotovland](#),⁹⁹ [rybar_mena](#),¹⁰⁰ [news_1tv](#),¹⁰¹ [russia](#),¹⁰² [militarycolumnist](#),¹⁰³ [rian_ru](#),¹⁰⁴ and [fisherman](#)¹⁰⁵.

79 EUvsDisinfo. Large language patterns: the new battlefield of Russian information warfare. October 2025. <https://euvs-disinfo.eu/large-language-models-the-new-battlefield-of-russian-information-warfare/>

80 Pravda Network: <https://albania.news-pravda.com/>.

81 Balkan Group on Telegram: <https://t.me/s/balkanar> and <https://archive.ph/CkKcd>.

82 Balkan_pro group on Telegram: https://t.me/s/balkan_pro.

83 Rentv group on Telegram: https://t.me/rentv_news.

84 MID_Russia group on Telegram: https://t.me/s/MID_Russia.

85 Tass_world group on Telegram: https://t.me/s/tass_world.

86 Baltnews group on Telegram: <https://t.me/s/baltnews>.

87 infantmilitario group on Telegram: <https://t.me/s/infantmilitario>.

88 warhistoryalconafter group on Telegram: <https://t.me/s/warhistoryalconafter>.

89 zvezdanews group on Telegram: <https://t.me/s/warhistoryalconafter>.

90 ukr_2025_ru group on Telegram: <https://t.me/s/warhistoryalconafter>.

91 vestiru24 group on Telegram: <https://t.me/s/vestiru24>.

92 belarusian_silovik group on Telegram: https://t.me/s/belarusian_silovik.

93 boris_rozhin group on Telegram: https://t.me/s/boris_rozhin.

94 politnavigator group on Telegram: <https://t.me/s/Politnavigator>.

95 ruptlyalert group on Telegram: <https://t.me/s/ruptlyalert>.

96 balkanosipper group on Telegram: <https://t.me/s/balkanossiper>.

97 historiographe group on Telegram: <https://t.me/s/historiographe>.

98 radiosputnik group on Telegram: https://t.me/s/radio_sputnik.

99 DarkZotovLand group on Telegram: <https://t.me/s/darkzotovland>.

100 rybarmena group on Telegram: https://t.me/s/rybar_mena.

101 news_1tv group on Telegram: https://t.me/s/news_1tv.

102 Russiau group on Telegram: <https://t.me/s/russiaun>.

103 militarycolumnist group on Telegram: https://t.me/s/new_militarycolumnist.

104 rian_ru group on Telegram: https://t.me/s/rian_ru.

105 rybar group on Telegram: <https://t.me/s/rybar>.

On [24.01.2026 \(archive\)](#),¹⁰⁶ Kosovo Police announced that during a search of an abandoned house in the village of Jagnjenica, Zubin Potok, they found and seized: an M48 rifle; 244 cartridges of various calibers; two empty magazines and a quantity of explosives.

This event was reported by [Pravda \(archive\)](#),¹⁰⁷ the Kremlin propaganda network, and much of the content of the report was taken from the Telegram group "[balkanar](#)." The news item describes the actions of the Kosovo Police as an "explosion of Serbophobia" and a "provocation to justify pressure on the Serbian minority," with the ultimate goal of persecuting Serbs. Pravda also published another article whose source was another Telegram group, "[infantmilitario](#)," which claimed that there are ongoing search operations targeting Serb homes.

Based on information published in the Telegram group "[balkanar](#)," the Pravda network reported that Kosovo Police had beaten a citizen named Vukasin Blažić and that there was an increase in the number of incidents directed against Serbs in Kosovo—"beatings of schoolchildren, arrests on false grounds, and constant psychological pressure are all part of a strategy to intimidate and suppress Serbs."

But what happened in reality? Vukasin Blažić's father, Sasa Blažić, gave an interview to the online media outlet "[Kosova Online](#)" ([archive](#)),¹⁰⁸ in which he alleged that the Kosovo Police had mistreated and beaten his son, but this claim turned out to be [false](#).¹⁰⁹ Based on camera footage, the Kosovo Police Inspectorate determined that the Kosovo Police had not used violence and were acting entirely within the scope of their legal duties.

[Video footage](#) broadcast on "KallxoPërnime" revealed that on 13 January 2026 police officers performed a routine traffic stop at the Kosovo Police substation on the Mitrovica-Leposaviq highway, stopping a car from North Mitrovica with three young people inside.¹¹⁰ [The stop](#) lasted about 7 minutes and, after completing the vehicle search and a physical search of the three people, the police officers allowed them to continue on their way without any issues.

106 Kosovo Police. "Police in the north again find weapons, ammunition and explosives in an abandoned house in Zubin Potok, North Mitrovica, 24 January 2026". https://www.facebook.com/KosovoPolice/posts/1195168412823415?ref=embed_post and <https://archive.ph/yI8UR>.

107 Pravda. "An explosion of Serbophobia." January 2026. <https://albania.news-pravda.com/world/2026/01/26/5197.html> and <https://archive.ph/t5Q01>.

108 Kosova online. "Sasa Blazic: "The Kosovo police beat my son at the checkpoint in Bistrica." January 2026. <https://www.kosovo-online.com/vesti/hronika/sasa-blazic-kosovski-polica-jci-su-mi-na-punktu-u-bistrici-pretukli-sina-14-1-2026> and [13172026.pdf - Google Drive](#).

109 Kallxo.com. "False claim that motivated messages of violence." January 2026. <https://kallxo.com/lajm/denoncimi-irreme-qe-motivoi-mesazhe-dhune/>.

110 Ibid.

THE PATH OF RUSSIAN DISINFORMATION: FROM THE KREMLIN TO MEDIA IN KOSOVO

A portion of traditional and online media in Kosovo, both in Albanian and Serbian, have not developed clear filters to prevent the republication of content originating from Russian disinformation sources. During the monitoring period, content published across 150 online media outlets in Kosovo was analysed, focusing on global events mentioning Ukraine.

Kosovo media have given significant attention to Russia's large-scale and unprovoked invasion of Ukraine. According to data from the Pikasa platform, between 1 September 2025 and 1 March 2026, around 23,000 articles about the war in Ukraine were published. Of these, 2,361 articles were selected for detailed analysis. The sample was drawn by selecting three evenly spaced days per month during the monitoring period, with a 10-day interval between each. For October 2025, the selected dates were 6, 16, and 26. Analysis showed that no sources were cited in 931 articles in this sample.

Considering that none of the monitored media have resident correspondents in Ukraine, this suggests that in about 40% of cases, the source of information was not disclosed. In Albanian-language media, Kremlin-controlled outlets are rarely cited directly, and their narratives are sometimes published unchanged, without context, and without presenting other perspectives.

In many cases, articles simply present statements from senior Russian officials, such as President Vladimir Putin, the Foreign Minister, or the Foreign Ministry spokesperson, which often contain strong accusations against the West and its allies since Russia launched its full-scale aggression on Ukraine in February of 2022.

On 10 December 2025, certain Albanian media ([Paparaci.com/archive](https://paparaci.com/archive),¹¹¹ [Top-Channel.tv/archive](https://top-channel.tv/archive),¹¹² and pamfleti.net/archive¹¹³) published articles with the title "[Lavrov attacks the EU and Britain: Trump, the only leader who understands Russia](#)." The headlines were not supported by any direct statements from Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov and largely consisted of accusations against the West. Lavrov is quoted as saying that President Trump has a good understanding of his counterpart, Vladimir Putin. The text also cites the American envoy, Steve Witkoff, as allegedly stating at a meeting a week earlier that he had shown understanding for guarantees of minority rights in Ukraine. The articles do not challenge these claims with public statements from senior U.S. officials, nor do they acknowledge the widely documented context of Russia's unprovoked attack on Ukraine.

111 Paparazzi. "Lavrov attacks the EU and Britain: "Trump, the only leader who understands Russia." December 2025. <https://paparaci.com/549085/lavrov-sulmon-be-ne-dhe-britanine-trump-i-vetmi-lider-qe-e-kupton-rusine/> and <https://archive.ph/AZLww>.

112 Top Channel. "Lavrov attacks the EU and Britain: "Trump, the only leader who understands Russia." 10 December 2025. <https://top-channel.tv/2025/12/10/lavrov-sulmon-be-dhe-britanine-trump-i-vetmi-lider-qe-e-kupton-rusine/> and <https://archive.ph/W7RUM>

113 Pamfleti.net. Putin's Minister attacks EU and Britain: "Trump the only leader who understands Russia." 10 December 2025. <https://pamfleti.net/bota/ministri-i-putin-on-be-dhe-britanine-trump-i-vetmi-lider-qe-e-kupton-ru-i311509> and <https://archive.ph/>

[EUvsDisinfo](#)¹¹⁴ also identified disinformation narratives being republished, without any editing, in Albanian-language media. Through these narratives, the Kremlin has tried to mislead audiences, both in Russia and abroad, by spreading false information about Ukraine and justifying its military intervention. But some of the Kremlin's disinformation narratives about Ukraine [also link to Kosovo](#).¹¹⁵

The Kremlin's framing of the war as a "special operation" has penetrated Kosovo media, and it is often used without clarification that it refers to an unprovoked invasion of Ukraine by Russia. According to media-monitoring data from Pikasa, the term "special operation" appeared in around 2,300 articles across 150 Kosovo-based outlets. This narrative has been published in Kosovo media without additional context, without arguments that provide counterpoints to the Kremlin's narrative, and without the official position of Ukraine (see [albanianpost.com / archive](#)¹¹⁶ and [syri.net / archive](#)¹¹⁷).

The "EUvsDisinfo" platform identified a total of 1,119 articles with disinformation content in which the Kremlin compared Ukraine to Nazism. But, as "EUvsDisinfo" argues,¹¹⁸ the government in Ukraine has no connection with Nazism. Moreover, Kremlin-controlled media [have also labeled other countries as Nazi](#).¹¹⁹ The Kremlin has also aimed to link much of the disinformation to countries that supported Ukraine, including Kosovo. Kosovo was often part of the narratives of Kremlin leaders, who draw false parallels, and, in some cases, falsely accuse Kosovars of fighting in Ukraine and even of organ trafficking.

The Kremlin's narrative about their fight against Nazism in Ukraine has also reached Albanian-language media. In some cases, the Kremlin's assertions equating the government in Ukraine to Nazism were published unchanged and without additional context.

An article titled "Moscow: The Kiev regime is an international neo-Nazi terrorist cell," which was published in several media outlets ([syri.net/archive](#), [euronews.al/archive](#), [oranews.tv/archive](#), [noa.al/archive](#), [pamfleti.net/archive](#), [balkanweb.com/archive](#)), discussed Russia's claims about fighting Nazism in Ukraine, as well as claims that the government in Ukraine is committing war crimes. However, the text contains none of the facts which support Ukraine's claims about crimes committed by Russia during this large-scale unprovoked invasion.

One of the most concerning patterns of disinformation showed up when looking at translated content from major international outlets like BBC, CNN, and others. The authors compared several cases where Albanian-language media cited global outlets about events related to Russia. Data indicate that during translation articles were often edited, removing key parts of the original content and leaving only elements that align with Russian narratives.

A similar practice was followed in the article published in [Nacionale](#) titled "[Russia says it uncovered a British-Ukrainian plot to steal a 'MiG-31' plane \(archive\)](#)".¹²⁰ The article refers to [the global news agency "Reuters" \(archive\)](#).¹²¹

114 EUvsDisinfo is a platform of the East StratCom Task Force, bringing together a team of experts with experience primarily in communications, journalism, social sciences, and Russian studies. <https://euvsdisinfo.eu/disinformation-cases/?text=Ukraine>.

115 Ibid.

116 Albanianpost. "Putin declares war on Ukraine." February 2022. <https://albanianpost.com/putin-i-shpall-lufte-ukraines/> and <https://archive.ph/k89Aq>.

117 Syri. "The Kremlin speaks for the first time after the attack in Ukraine." February 2022. <https://www.syri.net/bote/487765/flet-per-here-te-pare-kremlini-pas-sulmit-ne-ukraine/> and <https://archive.ph/A5NPb>.

118 EUvsDisinfo. "DISINFORMATION: Ukraine has a Nazi identity." <https://euvsdisinfo.eu/report/ukraine-has-a-nazi-identity/>.

119 EUvsDisinfo. "Nazis in the east, Nazis in the west, Nazis over the cuckoo's nest." February 2017. <https://euvsdisinfo.eu/nazi-east-nazi-west-nazi-over-the-cuckoos-nest/>.

120 Nacionale. "Russia says it uncovered a British-Ukrainian plot to steal a MiG-31 jet." November 2025. <https://nacionale.com/globale/rusia-thote-se-zbuloi-nje-plan-britaniko-ukrainas-per-tia-vjedhur-nje-aeroplan-mig-31>, and <https://archive.ph/YjikG>.

121 Reuters. "Russia says it has thwarted a Ukrainian-British plot to steal a MiG-31 jet, state media reports." November 2025. <https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/russia-says-it-foiled-ukrainian-british-plot-steal-mig-31-jet-state-media-2025-11-11/>, and <https://archive.ph/8Gfb9>.

It talks about a statement by Russia's Federal Security Service that it has "thwarted an alleged joint plot by the intelligence services of Ukraine and Great Britain to 'steal' an MiG-31 fighter jet armed with a Kinzhal missile worth about \$3 million." When comparing the news published on Reuters, serious interference in the content is evident. While Reuters clearly specifies that the claim about the attempted hijacking of the MiG aircraft is a claim made by Russian state media, the article published in the Albanian-language media completely omits this fact.

The [Reuters article](#) demonstrates how Reuters provides context on the ongoing tensions between Russia, Britain, and Ukraine regarding the war in Ukraine and on mutual accusations of intelligence activities and provocations. On the other hand, while the Albanian-language article contains a paragraph about how Russia considers Britain its main enemy and Moscow believes London incited the war in Ukraine, it omits the paragraph in which Reuters outlines the UK's position on the war in Ukraine.

The text at [Reuters](#) ends with this paragraph: *"Russia has long considered Britain its main enemy. Moscow accuses London of inciting the war in Ukraine and British intelligence of helping Ukraine carry out a series of operations deep inside Russia. Great Britain considers the Russian invasion of Ukraine an imperial-style land grab by Moscow. London has repeatedly warned that Russian intelligence is trying to sow chaos across Britain and Europe to undermine democracy."*¹²²

Meanwhile, in the article published on [Nacionale.com](#) the UK's position on the Russian invasion of Ukraine was deleted—the part that says: ***"Britain considers the Russian invasion of Ukraine an imperial-style land grab by Moscow. London has repeatedly warned that Russian intelligence is trying to sow chaos across Britain and Europe to undermine democracy."***¹²³

122 Ibid.

123 Nacionale. "Russia says it uncovered a British-Ukrainian plot to steal a MiG-31 jet." November 2025. <https://nacionale.com/globale/rusia-thote-se-zbuloi-nje-plan-britaniko-ukrainas-per-tia-vjedhur-nje-aeroplan-mig-31>, and <https://archive.ph/YjikG>.

124 Nacionale. "Putin says Russia will never bow to US pressure". October 2025. <https://nacionale.com/globale/putini-thote-se-rusia-sdo-te-perkulet-kurre-para-presionit-te-shba-se?g> and <https://archive.ph/F7GmY>.

125 Ibid.

126 Bota Sot. "Putin's ally: I am ready for a 'big deal' with the U.S.; Ukraine must remain independent." October 2025. <https://www.botasot.info/evrope-bota/2401121/aleati-i-putinit-jam-i-gatshem-per-nje-marrevshje-te-madhe-me-shba-ne-ukraina-duhet-te-mbetet-e-pavarur/> and <https://archive.ph/WD1hl>.

127 Ekonomia Online. "Russia deploys Oreshnik nuclear missiles in Belarus." December 2025. <https://ekonomiaonline.com/rusia-vendos-raketat-berthamore-oreshnik-ne-bjellorusi/> and <https://archive.ph/YJlIj>.

128 Kosovapress. "North Korea will build a museum to honor the soldiers killed in the Russia-Ukraine war." October 2025. <https://kosovapress.com/koreja-e-veriut-do-te-ndertoje-nje-muze-per-te-nderuar-ushtaret-e-vrare-ne-luften-rusi-ukraine> and <https://archive.ph/CdZVs>.

The same practice was observed in another article published on [Nacionale.com](#) titled: ***"Putin says Russia will never bow to US pressure"*** ([archive](#)).¹²⁴ The article published in the Guardian quotes US President Donald Trump and explains all the sanctions imposed by the US and the EU against Russia. However, these parts have been removed in the [Albanian-language version](#),¹²⁵ which only quotes Russian President Vladimir Putin and the Kremlin's claims.

The North Korea Narrative in Kosovo Media

By analysing content published in online media in Kosovo, researchers have identified new trends and new sources of information. In addition to Russian disinformation narratives, fake news originating from North Korea, Belarus (see [botasot.info/arkiva](#)¹²⁶ and [ekonomiaonline.com/arkiva](#)¹²⁷), and China is also republished unedited in Kosovo.

In an article published on [Kosovapress.com](#) titled, ***"North Korea will build a museum to honor soldiers killed in the Russia-Ukraine war"*** ([archive](#)),¹²⁸ Russia expresses appreciation for North Korea's involvement alongside the Russian army in the war in Ukraine. The text refers to the North Korean state news agency, KCNA, via the Turkish news agency, Anadolu. The article presents North Korean state narratives, reflecting the messaging of a communist and authoritarian regime, in opposition to the democratic world. It says that President Kim presided over the ceremony for the construction of a memorial museum for soldiers killed in Ukraine.

Having devoted almost the entire text solely to the North Korean perspective, the last paragraph of the text states that Russian president, Vladimir Putin, thanked the “brave soldiers” of North Korea who have joined the war, following an agreement between the Kremlin and the communist leader of the isolated Asian state.

An article titled “Kim and Putin send a clear message to the West: Cooperation between Russia and North Korea is strengthening,” which was published in several media outlets (kosovapost.net/archive,¹²⁹ timoni.al/archive,¹³⁰ top-channel.tv/archive,¹³¹ alsat.mk/archive¹³²) only presented the state narratives of North Korea and Russia, while omitting any other perspectives, including that of Ukraine regarding North Korea’s role in the war. The article also provides no background information or substantiating evidence for any of its claims.

Broadcasting Serbia’s Narrative Regarding the Kremlin’s Positions

The one-sided Serbian narrative about Russia has taken root in Albanian-language online media in Kosovo, which publish translated articles that refer to sources exclusively using the phrase “according to Serbian media,” which can be found at the beginning of many online articles.

A good example is an article about [the phone call between Aleksandar Vučić and Vladimir Putin on September 3, 2025](https://www.kosovapress.com/en/vuciq-putin-mesazh-te-qarte-perendimit-bashkepunimi-mes-rusise-dhe-korese-se-veriut-po-forcohet/) ([archive](https://www.kosovapress.com/en/vuciq-putin-mesazh-te-qarte-perendimit-bashkepunimi-mes-rusise-dhe-korese-se-veriut-po-forcohet/)),¹³³ published in [Kosova Press](https://www.kosovapress.com/), which is entirely based on the official Belgrade narrative on Russia and the political and economic relations between the two countries.

In these articles which cite the “Serbian media,” there is no actual source or hyperlink provided, nor is context or background information added to explain that Serbia is facing ongoing pressure and demands from the European Union and the United States to abandon Russian energy sources and align with the West against Moscow, following Russia’s unprovoked full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. The United States even [forced](https://www.kosovapress.com/en/vuciq-putin-mesazh-te-qarte-perendimit-bashkepunimi-mes-rusise-dhe-korese-se-veriut-po-forcohet/) ([archive](https://www.kosovapress.com/en/vuciq-putin-mesazh-te-qarte-perendimit-bashkepunimi-mes-rusise-dhe-korese-se-veriut-po-forcohet/))¹³⁴ Serbia to withdraw Russian energy companies’ shares in the Serbian company NIS.

According to “Serbian media” in the articles below, Serbia was simultaneously asking Russia to build a nuclear power plant, while Belgrade was being warned by the European Commission that the funds of the European Growth Plan could be frozen—funds provided for structural reforms to Western Balkan countries seeking European Union membership. While the first outlet to publish this news in Albanian refers to “Serbian media” without specifying the specific source, other portals copy the same text and cite this first Albanian publication as the source (see [KosovaPress/archive](https://www.kosovapress.com/en/vuciq-putin-mesazh-te-qarte-perendimit-bashkepunimi-mes-rusise-dhe-korese-se-veriut-po-forcohet/)¹³⁵ and [Kosova.info/archive](https://www.kosova.info/en/vuciq-putin-mesazh-te-qarte-perendimit-bashkepunimi-mes-rusise-dhe-korese-se-veriut-po-forcohet/)¹³⁶).

129 Kosova post. “Kim and Putin send a clear message to the West: Cooperation between Russia and North Korea is strengthening.” September 2025. <https://kosovapost.net/kim-dhe-putin-mesazh-te-qarte-perendimit-bashkepunimi-mes-rusise-dhe-korese-se-veriut-po-forcohet/> and <https://archive.ph/hNYzz>.

130 [Timoni.al](https://timoni.al). Kim and Putin issue a clear warning to the West: Cooperation between Russia and North Korea is increasing. 3 September 2025. <https://timoni.al/kim-dhe-putin-japin-nje-paralajmerim-te-qarte-per-perendimin-bashkepunimi-mes-rusise-dhe-korese-se-veriut-po-rritet/> and <https://archive.ph/>

131 [Top Channel](https://top-channel.tv). 3 September 2025. Kim and Putin send a clear message to the West: Cooperation between Russia and North Korea is strengthening. <https://top-channel.tv/2025/09/03/kim-dhe-putin-mesazh-te-qarte-perendimit-bashkepunimi-mes-rusise-dhe-korese-se-veriut-po-forcohet/> and <https://archive.ph/y3nZm>

132 [Alsats.mk](https://alsat.mk). Kim and Putin send a clear message to the West: Cooperation between Russia and North Korea is strengthening. 3 September 2025. https://alsat.mk/kim-dhe-putin-mesazh-te-qarte-perendimit-bashkepunimi-mes-rusise-dhe-korese-se-veriut-po-forcohet/?fbclid=IwY2xjawQr471leHRUA2FlbQlxMABicmlkETfYh2d2TETCRm9RNWQ0WGWJRc-3J0YwZhcHBfaWQ0MjlyMDM5MTc4ODIwMDg5MgABHoCRLNufyLrQyNAYEk4bhuxgedtdad_BjhtIT1NgXz9NV-gNtaPVCSS-4w5r_aem_NJz5XHjn_144Sc5hkqWvSA and <https://archive.ph/cx2B5>

133 [Kosovapress](https://www.kosovapress.com). “Vucic provides Russians with a nuclear plant in Serbia”. September 2025. <https://www.kosovapress.com/vuciq-u-ofron-ruseve-central-berthamor-ne-serbi> and <https://archive.ph/Kzh00>.

134 [Radio Free Europe](https://www.evropaelire.org). “USA give Serbia’s NIS more time to sell Russian majority shares.” December 2025. <https://www.evropaelire.org/a/shba-kohe-nisit-serb-shet-aksione-ruse/33632095.html> and <https://archive.ph/zPWPI>.

135 [Kosovapress](https://www.kosovapress.com). “Vucic provides Russians with a nuclear plant in Serbia.” September 2025. <https://www.kosovapress.com/en/vuciq-fton-rosatom-dhe-kompani-te-tjera-ruse-per-ndertimin-e-centraleve-berthamore-ne-serbi/> and <https://archive.ph/Kzh00>.

136 [Kosova.info](https://www.kosova.info). “Vucic invites Rosatom and other Russian companies to build nuclear power plants in Serbia.” <https://www.kosova.info/en/vuciq-fton-rosatom-dhe-kompani-te-tjera-ruse-per-ndertimin-e-centraleve-berthamore-ne-serbi/> and <https://archive.ph/wOF8a>.

Another example of how the Russian narrative shapes Albanian readers' perceptions is through articles that cite no sources, but only relay Russia's pro-Serb positions regarding the Balkans. An example of this is an article published on September 3, 2025, by several media outlets ([Paparaci.com/arkiva](#)¹³⁷, [gazetaexpress.com/arkiva](#),¹³⁸ [gazetatema.com/arkiva](#)¹³⁹ and [NTV Televizion/arkiva](#)¹⁴⁰) titled "The Kremlin spokesperson claims that Serbia is not responsible for tensions in the Balkans." The text lacks credible media sources, does not identify an author, and provides no context or background on Western pressure on Serbia to impose sanctions on Moscow following Russia's invasion of Ukraine. It consists solely of a reported statement and a verbatim quote from Dmitry Peskov, who claims that Serbia is not responsible for tensions in the Balkans.

137 Paparaci. "The Kremlin spokesman claims that Serbia is not responsible for the tensions in the Balkans." September 2025. <https://paparaci.com/528466/zedhenesi-i-kremlinit-pretendon-se-serbia-nuk-eshte-pergjegjese-per-tensio-net-ne-balkan/> and <https://archive.ph/kJWRP>.

138 Gazeta Express. "The Kremlin spokesman claims that Serbia is not responsible for the tensions in the Balkans." September 2025. <https://www.gazetaexpress.com/zedhenesi-i-kremlinit-pretendon-se-serbia-nuk-eshte-pergjegjese-per-tensio-net-ne-balkan/> and <https://archive.ph/1mAwD>.

139 Tema. "Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov: Serbia is not responsible for the tensions in the Balkans." September 2025. <https://www.gazetatema.net/rajon/zedhenesi-i-kremlinit-dmitry-peskov-serbia-nuk-eshte-pergjegjese-per-tens-i515834> and <https://archive.ph/5xezp>.

140 NTV Televizion. "Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov: Serbia is not responsible for the tensions in the Balkans." https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=v6_ebTQx2uk, and <https://archive.ph/l1Tb8>.

LINKING KOSOVO TO KREMLIN PROPAGANDA AGAINST UKRAINE

The EUvsDisinfo platform has documented several false narratives disseminated by the Kremlin and Kremlin controlled media that falsely link [the Kosovo issue to the war in Ukraine](#).¹⁴¹ Analysis of these cases, documented by the EUvsDisinfo platform, shows that Kremlin propaganda has systematically used [Kosovo](#) as a propaganda tool to legitimize or relativize Russian aggression against Ukraine. In these narratives, Kosovo is used to attack the West, Kosovo's independence is delegitimized, and false parallels are drawn between Kosovo and the Russian attack on Ukraine.

Key findings show that this disinformation campaign is carried out through several recurring narratives:

- The claim that Kosovo and Ukraine are “instruments of the West;”
- The recurrence of unfounded accusations of organ trafficking that first emerged during the war in Kosovo;
- The claims that former Kosovo Liberation Army members or citizens from Kosovo and Albania are fighting as mercenaries in Ukraine;
- The claims that NATO is inciting interethnic conflict in Kosovo to distract attention from the war in Ukraine.

These narratives have been spread by senior Russian officials and amplified by state or pro-Kremlin media, including Sputnik and Russia Today. The analysis also shows that some of these claims have been reproduced in several Albanian-language media outlets, often without fact-checking and without additional context provided. In this way, the Kremlin's propaganda narrative seeks to downplay Russian aggression against Ukraine, but also to undermine Kosovo's international legitimacy by drawing on historical narratives which have been discredited.

Disputing Statehood

[The disinformation narrative](#)¹⁴² that is most often repeated is that “[Kosovo and Ukraine do not act in a sovereign manner \(archive\)](#)¹⁴³ but are instruments of the West,” a narrative which attempts to delegitimize the statehood and independent decision-making of these two nations. This disinformation narrative has been pushed by senior political figures in Russia. The spokeswoman for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Maria Zakharova, stated that, “Russia will never forget that Kosovo is part of Serbia.”

The same claims have also been published in Albanian-language media, without additional context provided and without challenging the narrative against Kosovo (see [indeksonline.net/arkiva](#)¹⁴⁴ and [botasot.info/arkiva](#)¹⁴⁵).

141 EUvsDisinfo. “False narratives linking the issue of Kosovo to Ukraine.” <https://euvsdisinfo.eu/disinformation-cases/?-text=Ukraine%2C%20kosovo>.

142 EUvsDisinfo. “DISINFORMATION: Ukraine and Kosovo are not independent in decision-making.” August 2024. <https://euvsdisinfo.eu/report/ukraine-and-kosovo-are-not-independent-in-decision-making/>.

143 Sputnik. “Ukraine and Kosovo are not independent in decision-making – Eksperti.” August 2024. <https://sputnikglobe.com/20240820/ukraine-kosovo-not-independent-in-decision-making---expert-1119837397.html> and <https://archive.ph/1Uefc>.

144 Indeksonline. Zakharova. “Russia will never forget that Kosovo is part of Serbia.” March 2024. <https://indeksonline.net/zakharova-rusia-nuk-do-ta-harroje-kurre-se-kosova-eshte-pjese-e-serbise/> and <https://archive.ph/D8urY>.

145 Bota Sot. “Putin's spokeswoman: Russia will never forget that Kosovo is part of Serbia.” March 2024. <https://www.botasot.info/lajme/2144440/zedhenesja-e-putinit-rusia-nuk-do-ta-harroje-kurre-se-kosova-eshte-pjese-e-serbise/> and <https://archive.ph/urOhn>.

Meanwhile, the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, [Sergey Lavrov \(archive\)](#),¹⁴⁶ has referred to Kosovo's independence as a "coup d'état" and said that "the international community has used double standards in the case of Kosovo and that of Crimea" (see [alo.rs/archive](#),¹⁴⁷ [sd.rs/archive](#)¹⁴⁸ and [rt.rs/archive](#)¹⁴⁹). The claims of Minister Lavrov have also been published in Albanian-language media, even without verification of their legitimacy (see [gazeta-shqip.com/archive](#),¹⁵⁰ [balkanweb.com/archive](#),¹⁵¹ and [radiokosovaelire.com/archive](#)¹⁵²).

However, Ukraine is a sovereign and independent state with a [president](#)¹⁵³ and [parliament](#) that are democratically elected. The country is not controlled by the U.S., the EU, or any foreign organization or government. Both the [EU](#)¹⁵⁴ and the [United States](#) respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine. The Republic of Kosovo is not like Crimea or Donbas (see [here/archive](#),¹⁵⁵ [here/archive](#),¹⁵⁶ and [here/archive](#)¹⁵⁷). NATO's intervention in Kosovo was undertaken with the aim of preventing

a humanitarian catastrophe and the mass killing of civilians. Kosovo [declared its independence](#)¹⁵⁸ in 2008 and has been recognized by more than 120 countries. On 22 July 2010, the International Court of Justice [ruled](#) that "Kosovo's Declaration of Independence on 17 February 2008 did not violate international law."¹⁵⁹

Disinformation About Organ Trafficking

Another disinformation narrative concerns the Kosovo Liberation Army. In 2023, [Russian spokeswoman Zaharova accused Ukraine \(archive\)](#)¹⁶⁰ of organ trafficking, comparing the alleged trafficking operation in Ukraine to false claims of organ trafficking that was supposedly carried out at the "Yellow House" during the Kosovo war.

146 Srbija Danas. "These are double standards" Lavrov compared Kosovo and Ukraine: An example of Western "rules" in action." October 2025. <https://www.sd.rs/vesti/kosovo/su-dvostruki-standardi-lavrov-uporedio-kim-i-ukrajinu-primer-zapadnih-pravila-na-delu-2025-10-15> and <https://archive.ph/eyEa9>.

147 Alo!. "They took away from Serbs their historic land" Lavrov compared Kosovo and the situation in Ukraine." October 2025. <https://www.alo.rs/vesti/svet/440588/oduzeli-su-od-srba-njihovu-istorijsku-zemlju-lavrov-uporedio-kosovo-sa-situacijom-u-ukrajini.html>.

148 Srbija Danas. "These are double standards" Lavrov compared Kosovo and Ukraine: An example of Western "rules" in action." October 2025. <https://www.sd.rs/vesti/kosovo/su-dvostruki-standardi-lavrov-uporedio-kim-i-ukrajinu-primer-zapadnih-pravila-na-delu-2025-10-15> and <https://archive.ph/eyEa9>.

149 RT Balkan. "Lavrov compared Kosovo and Ukraine: An example of Western "rules" in action." October 2025. <https://rt.rs/rusija/160245-lavrov-kosovo-ukrajina-pravila-zapada/>.

150 Gazeta Shqip. "NATO wanted to destroy Yugoslavia" / Lavrov demands "accountability" from the West for Kosovo: Why Albanians..." March 2022. <https://gazeta-shqip.com/bota/nato-donte-te-shkaterronte-jugosllavine-lavrov-i-kerkon-llogari-perendimit-i1172241/>.

151 Balkanweb. "Russian diplomat Lavrov: Since '91, the separation of Kosovo from Serbia has been part of Western plans. KLA was financed by Germans and the U.S." March 2024. <https://www.balkanweb.com/en/Russian-diplomat-Lavrov-since-91--the-separation-of-Kosovo-from-Serbia-in-the-plans-of-the-West--funded-by-the-Germans-and-the-USA/#gsc.tab=0>.

152 Radio Free Europe. "Lavrov compares Kosovo to Crimea and Donbas, addresses the UN on self-determination issue." January 2026. <https://www.radiokosovaelire.com/lavrov-krahason-kosoven-me-krimene-e-donbasin-i-drejtohet-okb-seper-ceshtjen-e-vetevendosjes/>.

153 President of Ukraine: <https://www.president.gov.ua/en/president/about-president>.

154 EU. "EU-Ukraine relations – factsheet." https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/eu-ukraine-relations-factsheet_en.

155 Reporteri. "Kurti for the BBC: No Kosovo citizen went to fight in Ukraine. Serbia and Russia have strong political ties." March 2022. <https://reporteri.net/en/NEWS/kurti-per-bbc-asnje-qytetar-nga-kosova-nuk-ka-shkuar-per-te-luftuar-ne-ukraine-serbia-e-rusia-kane-lidhje-te-for-te-politike/>.

156 Telegrafi. "Hill: Comparing Kosovo to Crimea, an ungrounded justification from Russia." March 2014. <https://telegrafi.com/hill-krahasimi-i-kosoves-me-krimene-justifikim-i-pabaze-i-rusise/>.

157 Ekonomia.info. "Bildt: Comparing Kosovo to Crimea is unacceptable." <https://ekonomia.info/?page=1,5,364081>.

158 UNHCR. The Declaration of Independence of Kosovo. <https://www.refworld.org/legal/legislation/natlegbod/2008/en/56552>.

159 International Court of Justice. <https://www.icj-cij.org/node/101885>.

160 RT Balkan. "Zaharova: Organ trafficking is a Western business, the same scenario in Ukraine and in Kosovo." May 2023. <https://lat.rt.rs/rusija/32683-zaharova-trgovina-organima-kosovo-metohija-ukrajina/> dhe <https://archive.ph/Lv1AB>.

[Russia Today \(archive\)](#)¹⁶¹ and [Sputnik Serbia \(archive\)](#)¹⁶² have disseminated Zaharova's disinformation narrative that the Kosovo Liberation Army still exists but under a different name, and that it is likely present in Ukraine as a mercenary organization. Similar claims have also been published on the Facebook page 'Serbian Times,' which falsely claimed that "in the late 1990s in Kosovo [people] were kidnapped in Serbia, their organs were removed and sold on the black market!"¹⁶³

Allegations of organ trafficking during the war in Kosovo first emerged in the book "Madam Prosecutor," by Carla Del Ponte, the former chief prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, ICTY. Later, Swiss senator, Dick Marty, [drafted a report in 2010](#) titled "Inhumane treatment and illegal trafficking of human organs in Kosovo,"¹⁶⁴ which was then approved at the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe.

These claims are unsubstantiated and have been proven false. Matti Raatikainen, Head of War Crime Investigations at EULEX, stated clearly in 2010 that [claims that Kosovo Liberation Army \(KLA\)](#)¹⁶⁵ was involved in organ trafficking at the so-called "Yellow House" in Albania are not supported by evidence. The allegations made by Swiss Senator Dick Marty were investigated by US Attorney [Clint Williamson](#),¹⁶⁶ who

announced in July 2014 that his team's findings did not include substantiated evidence of organ trafficking.. [In the indictment published by the Specialized Prosecutor's Office](#)¹⁶⁷ against Hashim Thaçi and others, none of the 10 counts are related to organ trafficking, and none of the places of detention identified in Kosovo and Albania are specified as places where such activities were carried out. In [his closing statement](#),¹⁶⁸ The former President of Kosovo, Hashim Thaçi, stated that former ambassador Dick Marty had been manipulated by Russian disinformation.

Furthermore, according to [EUvsDisinfo](#),¹⁶⁹ allegations of organ trafficking during military operations in Ukraine are part of a long-running disinformation campaign by the Kremlin. Pro-Kremlin media outlets have a long history of spreading this false accusation in relation with other conflicts, such as in the case of Russia's war against Georgia in 2008, the war in Kosovo, as well as the war in Syria, always with the aim of smearing groups that oppose Moscow's policies. [EUvsDisinfo](#)¹⁷⁰ argues that [organ transplantation is a very complex time-sensitive medical procedure](#)¹⁷¹ that cannot be performed in field conditions. Claims of organ trafficking during wartime ignore medical realities and disregard ethical standards, serving only to spread mistrust and confusion.

161 Rusia Sot. "Zaharova: KLA and organ trade – the international community needs to answer." August 2025. <https://lat.rt.rs/rusija/44302-zaharova-ovk-trgovina-organa/> and <https://archive.ph/q2tiw>.

162 Sputnik. "Zaharova: Ukraine – a leader in the organ black market for transplant, cooperating even with the KLA." August 2023. <https://lat.sputnikportal.rs/20230807/zaharova-ukrajina---lider-na-cnom-trzistu-organa-za-transplantaciju-1159574009.html#> and <https://archive.ph/4w7Vf>.

163 False claims on organ trafficking in Kosovo. September 2024.. <https://kallxo.com/krypometer/konstatime-te-rremeth-trafikimit-te-organeve-ne-kosove/>

164 Marty, Dick (2011). "Inhumane treatment and illegal trafficking of human organs in Kosovo. Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe." <https://pace.coe.int/en/files/12608#trace-2>.

165 Balkan Insight. "EULEX: "There is no evidence that the KLA trafficked organs." May 2010. <https://balkaninsight.com/2010/05/07/eulex-no-evidence-kla-trafficked-organs/btj/>.

166 Radio Free Europe. "Williamson: "Sufficient evidence for crimes against humanity." July 2014. <https://www.evropaeli-re.org/a/25473735.html>.

167 Kosovo Specialist Chambers and Specialist Prosecutor's Office. [The issue of Hashim Thaçi and others | Kosovo Specialist Chambers](#).

168 Kosovo Specialist Chambers and Specialist Prosecutor's Office. 18 February 2026: Thaçi and others, Closing statements. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SjR-bx4pQhY&t=9271s>.

169 EUvsDisinfo. "DISINFORMATION: The conflict in Ukraine has become a battleground for the illegal trade in internal organs." May 2025. <https://euvsdisinfo.eu/report/the-ukrainian-conflict-has-become-a-battlefield-for-illegal-trading-of-internal-organs/>.

170 Ibid.

171 Mythdetector. Repeated disinformation by pro-Kremlin media about the organ trade in Ukraine. December 2022. <https://mythdetector.ge/en/recurring-disinformation-by-pro-kremlin-media-about-organ-trading-in-ukraine/>.

“Kosovo’s Soldiers are Fighting in Ukraine”

In addition to claims that members of the KLA involved in the war in Ukraine are supposedly engaged in organ trafficking, Russian media have pushed the narrative that Albanians from Kosovo and Albania are fighting as mercenaries on Ukraine’s side.

Kremlin-controlled media outlet [Rossiyskaya \(archive\)](#)¹⁷² claimed that the KLA is still active and may be present in Ukraine as mercenaries. Meanwhile [Sputnik \(archive\)](#)¹⁷³ reported that, according to Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, Russia is verifying information that mercenaries are being recruited in Kosovo, Albania, and Bosnia and Herzegovina to be sent to Donbas. The same disinformation narrative was repeated by Russian President, Vladimir Putin, and was published in Albanian-language media. Moreover, some portals have published Putin’s claim that mercenaries from Kosovo are fighting in Ukraine, without adding any context or the response from Kosovo’s institutions (see [mitropol.net/archive](#),¹⁷⁴ the Facebook page [CityofMitrovica/archive](#),¹⁷⁵ and [periskopi.com/archive](#)¹⁷⁶).

The same disinformation was also spread by Russia’s Ministry of Defense, which, in a published statement, falsely claimed that “383 mercenaries from Albania and Kosovo” are fighting in Ukraine and that, so far, 171 people from these two countries have been killed. The claim was published on Albanian-language portals with no editorial interventions. This news was published on at least 7 portals (see [shqiptarja.com/archive](#),¹⁷⁷ [report-tv.al2/archive](#),¹⁷⁸ [oranews.tv/archive](#),¹⁷⁹ [noa.al5/archive](#),¹⁸⁰ [TV Window/archive](#),¹⁸¹ [albanian.history.net/archive](#),¹⁸² and [5pyetjet.al/archive](#)¹⁸³). These news reports included no statement from the Governments of Albania or Kosovo, no additional context, and no evidence to verify these claims being made by the Kremlin.

The Prime Minister of Kosovo, Albin Kurti, [declared \(archive\)](#)¹⁸⁴ that these claims were Russian disinformation and that no citizen of Kosovo has gone to fight in Ukraine. The statement was echoed by Kosovo’s Minister of Internal Affairs, [Xhelal Sveçla \(archive\)](#),¹⁸⁵ and [the Prime Minister of Albania, Edi Rama \(archive\)](#).¹⁸⁶

172 Rossiyskaya Gazeta. “World leader in the black market for organ transplants: in Ukraine, organs are traded both online and in the traditional way.” August 2023. <https://rg.ru/2023/08/06/potroshiteli.html> and <https://archive.ph/ktQmn>.

173 Sputnik. “Are mercenaries being recruited from Kosovo, Albania and Bosnia for Donbas?” Lavrov: We are verifying this.” February 2022. <https://lat.sputnikportal.rs/20220218/vrbuju-placenike-s-kosova-iz-albanije-i-bih-za-donbas-lavrov-proveravamo-1134476350.html> and <https://archive.ph/ooSwL>.

174 Mitropol. “Putin: Mercenaries from Kosovo are fighting in Ukraine.” March 2022. <https://mitropol.net/putin-mercenary-nga-kosova-po-luftojne-ne-ukraine/>.

175 Qyteti i Mitrovices, Facebook post. Putin: Mercenaries from Kosovo are fighting in Ukraine. <https://www.facebook.com/CityofMitrovica/posts/putin-mercenary%C3%AB-nga-kosova-po-luftojn%C3%AB-n%C3%AB-ukrain%C3%ABpresident-i-rusis%C3%AB-vladimir-pu/4811202668995816/>.

176 Periskopi. Putin: Mercenaries from Kosovo are fighting in Ukraine. <https://www.periskopi.com/putin-mercenary-nga-kosova-po-luftojne-ne-ukraine/>.

177 Shqiptarja.com, [Facebook post](#).

178 Report TV, [Facebook post](#).

179 Ora News, [Facebook post](#).

180 NOA National News Agency, [Facebook post](#).

181 Dritare TV, [Facebook post](#).

182 Autochthonous, [Facebook post](#).

183 5pyetjet al, [Facebook post](#).

184 Gazeta Blic. “Kurti: No citizen from Kosovo has gone to fight in Ukraine. Serbia and Russia have strong political ties.” March 2023. <https://gazetablic.com/kurti-asnje-qytetar-nga-kosova-nuk-ka-zhkuar-per-te-luftuar-ne-ukraine-serbia-e-rusia-kane-liedhje-te-for-te-politike/>.

185 Radio Free Europe. “Sveçla: “Kosovo has no fighters in Ukraine.” July 2022. <https://www.evropaelire.org/a/kosova-mercenary-ukraine-/31948456.html>.

186 Top Channel. “Albanian mercenaries in Ukraine? Rama: A disturbing accusation, I am following it closely.” https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_dcOiiA3aew.

The [Krypometër fact-checker](#)¹⁸⁷ verified some fake news circulating on social networks about an agreement to send the Kosovo Army to Ukraine. While the Kosovo Security Force, KSF, did participate in several training sessions organized in the United Kingdom for Ukrainian soldiers, especially in the field of demining (see [here](#)¹⁸⁸ and [here](#)¹⁸⁹), there has been no decision to send the KSF to fight in Ukraine.

False Accusations Against NATO for Inciting Interethnic Conflicts

Another narrative spread by Russian media is that [NATO has escalated \(archive\)](#)¹⁹⁰ the situation in Kosovo in May 2023, to distract Russia from the front in Ukraine. [Zakharova had stated](#)¹⁹¹ that NATO troops have exacerbated hostilities between the local authorities and the ethnic Serb majority in northern Kosovo. These statements were made after protests were organized in North Mitrovica, Leposavić, Zubin Potok, and Zvečan, to [oppose](#)¹⁹² the assumption of office by Albanian mayors who had won the municipal elections.

These [protests](#)¹⁹³ turned violent after groups of hooligans attacked Kosovo police officers, KFOR soldiers, and the media. The protests that began on 26 May 2023 became radicalized on 29 May 2023, especially in Zvečan, KFOR soldiers guarding the municipal building were being assaulted by projectiles like stones, other hard objects, and even bullets. Dozens of KFOR soldiers were wounded and injured. One KFOR soldier had his leg amputated due to injuries.

Investigations by the Prosecution Office and several court decisions in Kosovo agree that the perpetrators of the violence were Serbian citizens. On 27 February 2024, the Court declared Rados Petrovic and [Dusan Obrenovic](#)¹⁹⁴ [guilty of the attack](#),¹⁹⁵ sentencing them to six months in prison. The sentence was later converted into fines. Meanwhile, on 14 January 2026, [another person was arrested](#),¹⁹⁶ who was suspected of attacking members of KFOR and the Kosovo Police at the same protests.

187 Krypometër. "Fake news that the Kosovo Army will be sent to fight in Ukraine." Kallxo.com, March 2022. <https://kallxo.com/krypometer/lajmi-i-rreme-se-ushtria-e-kosoves-do-te-dergohet-per-te-luftuar-ne-ukraine/>.

188 Minister of Defense, Facebook post. <https://www.facebook.com/ejup.maqedonci1/posts/pfbid0eF9G6LHV3n8nZQkXk3Cc5m53R27tsq2aoTeybVkJgxjK18jrAe3CBzhTGzmv2L6wl>.

189 Kosovo Security Force, Facebook post. <https://www.facebook.com/SHPFSK/posts/pfbid0PYsFFUUhCDHSVMz6UmPm-bqipjK1HrPpPGr4EBfJg29Xzbidk45re62bpu9mvpNLFsl>.

190 RT. "NATO is an 'escalation factor' in Kosovo - Moscow." May 2023. <https://www.rt.com/russia/577147-nato-escalation-kosovo-russia/>.

191 Ibid.

192 Kallxo.com. "On alert: How did the tensions in the north start?" June 2023. <https://kallxo.com/lajm/nen-alarm-sinisen-tensionet-ne-veri/>.

193 Ibid.

194 Kallxo.com. "Obrenović, arrested for violence in the Zvečan protest, two more months in detention." June 2023. <https://kallxo.com/ligji/obrenoviq-i-arrestuar-per-dhune-ne-protesten-e-zvecanit-edhe-dy-muaj-ne-paraburgim/>.

195 Kallxo.com. "The court decides on the two defendants for the attack on KFOR in May 2023 in the north." February 2024. <https://kallxo.com/lajm/gjykata-vendos-per-dy-te-akuzuarit-per-sulmin-ndaj-kfor-it-ne-maj-2023-ne-veri/>.

196 Kallxo.com. "A suspect was arrested for attacking members of KFOR and Kosovo Police." January 2026. <https://kallxo.com/lajm/arrestohet-nje-i-dyshuar-per-sulm-ndaj-pjesetareve-te-kfor-it-dhe-policise-se-kosoves/>.

DISINFORMATION ROOTED IN IDEOLOGY

The country's national security is continuously challenged by terrorist groups motivated by radical Islam and terrorist groups supported by right-wing extremism, mainly ethno-nationalist.

Various experts who have been interviewed for Kallxo.com's "Death by Disinformation" documentary, which aired on 14 December 2025,¹⁹⁷ have concluded that incidents of interethnic violence in Kosovo where there were numerous victims were incited by nationalist elements who continue to spread disinformation about ethnic groups.

Undoubtedly, radical Islamic movements also pose a challenge to security institutions and public order in Kosovo.

Disinformation narratives related to Islamic radicalism in Kosovo have developed mainly in the context of radical Sunni currents, not Shiite ones.

The religious makeup of the population in Kosovo is overwhelmingly Sunni, which makes the influence of Iran-linked currents relatively limited. According to assessments by security institutions in Kosovo, efforts to spread the Iranian narrative have had minimal impact and have been largely rejected by society.

According to analysis by officers at the Counter-Terrorism Directorate of the Kosovo Police, Iranian influence in Kosovo is limited due to resistance from the population.

In this context, disinformation narratives and radicalization efforts have focused mainly on supporters of radical Sunni currents, especially ideological interpretations associated with the Wahhabi and Salafi spirit. In the discourse of

these currents, the name of the theologian **Muhammad Nasiruddin al-Albani is often mentioned**. He is a well-known figure in Salafist currents, whose interpretations are often used selectively or distorted in service of radical narratives.

According to analyses by security institutions in Kosovo, the spread of extremist ideologies has not always followed the same pathways. Originally it was more decentralized, and it only became more organized and strategic later on, while online content remained decentralized.

The internet and social media platforms are key to the spread of radical narratives. According to analyses by counterterrorism units in Kosovo, online propaganda has become one of the main tools for recruitment. "One of the main aspects ISIS has promoted is what they call 'online jihad' or jihad through online platforms, placing great emphasis on disseminating ideologies with the aim of recruiting and identifying people for further recruitment," said a counterterrorism analyst in an interview with BIRN.¹⁹⁸

Investigations by the Special Prosecutor's Office and the Counterterrorism Office show that radical religious currents in Kosovo have caused interfaith and interethnic conflicts, using their online presence to spread hatred between Sunni and Shia currents. Radical church movements and ISIS supporters have been the subject of dozens of indictments for [incitement to hatred](#)¹⁹⁹ and terrorism,²⁰⁰ while their sources of funding

197 "Death by Disinformation" - The history of conflicts stemming from disinformation, December 14, 2025; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8r54A0WY9og&time_continue=15&source_ve_path=MjM4NTE&embeds_referring_euri=https%3A%2F%2Fkallxo.com%2F

198 "Death by Disinformation" - The history of conflicts stemming from disinformation, December 14, 2025; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8r54A0WY9og&time_continue=15&source_ve_path=MjM4NTE&embeds_referring_euri=https%3A%2F%2Fkallxo.com%2F

199 Kallxo.com. "The truth about the mass in the Orthodox church in Podujevo." April 2024. <https://kallxo.com/komuna/fact-check/e-verteta-per-meshen-ne-kishen-ortodokse-ne-podujeve/>.

200 Kallxo.com. "Accused of Distributing Leaflets Aimed at Criticizing the 'Shia' Religious Sect, the Defendants Do Not Plead

often remain unknown.²⁰¹ Analyses of online messages show that radical propaganda has reached a wide audience, strengthening its influence in local communities.

Analysis of online content shows that readers in Kosovo encounter hate speech and lies that are mainly generated in service of disinformation narratives with a religious framing. The main goal of disinformation is to cause fear and affect the emotions of citizens. False reporting on religious issues has the most impact and emotional resonance. Kosovo, as a multiethnic and multireligious country, has been the target of disinformation that essentially aims at disrupting interfaith tolerance in Kosovo. Even ethnic issues in Kosovo are often translated as interfaith problems and conflicts, despite the fact that the [Constitution](#)²⁰² clearly defines Kosovo as a “secular state and neutral in matters of religious beliefs.”

Monitoring online platforms in Kosovo has identified some of the main disinformation narratives about religious issues and their goals. There are reports being made against the Catholic, the Islamic, and the Orthodox faiths. Cases have also been documented where, through reporting on religious issues, there is an attempt to garner sympathy for political figures, like Vladimir Putin, the President of Russia.

Attempts to Improve Putin’s Image Through Religion

Since Russia’s unprovoked attack on Ukraine, a series of publications in the media and on social media in Kosovo have aimed to improve the

image of Russia’s President, Vladimir Putin, by manipulating religious and historical narratives. Monitored publications and posts attempt to portray Putin as a [protector \(archive\)](#)²⁰³ of the Quran and a leader who upholds Islamic values, while also spreading unfounded claims that Russia could turn into a [Muslim state \(archive\)](#)²⁰⁴ within 30 years; published in the Facebook group [ALLAH IS 1](#).

A post claiming Putin signed a new law punishing insults to the Prophet Muhammad and the Quran was widely shared, receiving around 1 million views across all platforms (see [here/archive](#),²⁰⁵ [here/archive](#),²⁰⁶ and [here/archive](#)²⁰⁷). The claims in the posts were false as Russia adopted both [the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation](#)²⁰⁸ and [the Administrative Code of Russia](#),²⁰⁹ which prescribe penalties for intentionally committing acts to offend religious feelings, in 2013 and has not modified them since.

A video with similar claims was published on the Facebook page [JOQ Albania \(archive and archive\)](#).²¹⁰ The video, released in 2026 during the month of Ramadan, is said to have been shot in 2024 during a visit by Russian President Vladimir Putin to the Russian region of Chechnya and it shows him kissing the Quran, the Muslim holy book. In less than 24 hours the video received around 200,000 views and over 300 comments.

The same video was also been published on [Vox Albania \(archive\)](#).²¹¹

Facebook pages like “[Ottomans](#)”²¹² ([archive](#)) combine religious narratives with the glorification of Russian figures, disseminating content that denigrates Albanian leaders and national symbolism, while promoting Russian Orthodox clerics. In one of their [posts](#)

Guilty.” 17 March 2026. <https://kallxo.com/lajm/akuzohen-se-shperndane-fletushka-qe-kishin-qellim-kritiken-ndaj-sektit-fetar-shia-te-akuzuarit-nuk-e-pranojne-fajsine/>

201 Kallxo.com. “Exclusive: The Prosecutor’s File on ISIS’s Plan to Destabilize Kosovo.” 10 October 2018. <https://kallxo.com/lajm/ekskluzive-dosja-e-prokuroris-e-per-planin-e-isis-it-per-ta-destabilizuar-kosoven/>

202 Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo. <https://gzk.rks-gov.net/ActDocumentDetail.aspx?ActID=3702>.

203 Facebook post. <https://www.facebook.com/share/p/1DeKFTBxEs/>.

204 Post in a Facebook group. <https://www.facebook.com/groups/1397388597180698/posts/1513259278926962/>.

205 Bota Islame. Facebook post. <https://www.facebook.com/share/p/1C4v3eF4CC/>.

206 Feja Islame. Facebook post. <https://www.facebook.com/share/p/15xw8ccQBk/>.

207 Post in a Facebook group. <https://www.facebook.com/share/p/1Aje2METsL/>.

208 Criminal Code of the Russian Federation. https://www.consultant.ru/document/cons_doc_LAW_10699/3f061f-b01a04145dc7e07fe39a97509bd2da705f/.

209 United States Commission on International Religious Freedom (2025). Update on the issue: Prosecuting blasphemy in Russia. <https://www.uscirf.gov/sites/default/files/2025-04/2025%20Issue%20Update%20Prosecuting%20Blasphemy%20in%20Russia.pdf>.

210 JOQ Albania, video on Facebook. <https://www.facebook.com/reel/1476134287283563>.

211 Postim i Vox Albania. <https://www.facebook.com/reel/1964403808287598>

212 Osmanlitë, Facebook post. <https://www.facebook.com/share/p/1DxFZTTTab/>.

([archive](#))²¹³, they wrote: “SLAVA RASSIYA, SLAVA BELOVED SERGEJ LADROV. Russian Foreign Minister Sergej Lladrov turned 72 today, and from the bottom of my heart I wish Sergey a long, healthy, and dignified life for another 100 years.” The same page [published](#) ([archive](#))²¹⁴ a photo of President Vjosa Osmani with a red ‘x’ over her face, [desecrated the national flag](#) ([archive](#)),²¹⁵ and shared videos of [Russian Orthodox clergy](#) ([archive](#)).²¹⁶

This propaganda activity occurs in parallel with a brutal military aggression, the systematic bombing of Ukrainian cities, the destruction of civilian infrastructure, and the use of nuclear blackmail, which have caused the deathsg of thousands of civilians and the displacement of millions of refugees. The Kremlin’s strategy includes not only military campaigning, but also manipulation of religious and cultural perceptions to consolidate power and destabilize regional and global security. Since February 2022, Vladimir Putin has led a large scale [unprovoked invasion](#)²¹⁷ against Ukraine, causing the bloodiest war in Europe since World War II. Under his orders, the Russian military has systematically bombed cities, destroying civilian infrastructure, hospitals, and schools. His actions have led to [the killing of thousands of civilians and the displacement of millions of refugees](#).²¹⁸

Putin has [illegally](#)²¹⁹ and violently annexed regions of Ukraine and used nuclear blackmail, destabilizing global security and isolating Russia from the world.

Kremlin’s Disinformation About the Orthodox Church

Russian online platforms and Serbian government officials often politicize incidents near Orthodox churches, spreading false narratives that portray Kosovo as an aggressive actor towards the Serbian community. Media monitoring has found that incidents in Kosovo are politicized and politically framed by media in Serbia, and especially by Kremlin-controlled media.

The Diocese of Prizren [reacted](#) ([archive](#))²²⁰ negatively to a project by the Municipality of Prizren for the construction of a hiking trail near an Orthodox church. Serbia’s former prime minister, Milos Vucevic, also responded to the proposed project and [presented](#)²²¹ it as an attempt by Albin Kurti to destroy everything Serbian in Kosovo. This [reaction](#) by Vucevic was amplified by Kremlin-controlled media in order to spread their narrative.

The Kremlin-controlled network [Pravda](#) ([archive](#)),²²² which distributes news in 93 languages, reposted a claim by Russian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Maria Zakharova that the Kosovo Government “is trying to rewrite history by allowing provocations against Serbian shrines in the region.” Pravda also falsely reported that 90% of Orthodox cemeteries were damaged. “This is what 90% of Serbian cemeteries in Kosovo look like today” is the [description](#) ([archive](#))²²³ that was placed above the published photos of several damaged graves.

213 Ibid.

214 Osmanlitë, Facebook post. <https://www.facebook.com/share/p/18kwBGqDnd/>.

215 The Ottomans, a post on Facebook. <https://www.facebook.com/share/p/1EVo2fqgD/>.

216 Osmanlitë, Facebook video. <https://www.facebook.com/share/v/1CJk5qzv33/>.

217 Center for Strategic and International Studies. “Seven contemporary perspectives on the state of the war in Ukraine.” November 2025. <https://www.csis.org/analysis/seven-contemporary-insights-state-ukraine-war>.

218 Reuters. Ukraine and Russia at war. <https://www.reuters.com/world/ukraine-russia-war/>.

219 Council on Foreign Relations. “How Russia’s invasion of Ukraine violates international law.” February 2022. <https://www.cfr.org/articles/how-russias-invasion-ukraine-violates-international-law>.

220 Kossev. “Without the consent of the SOC: Illegal construction on a 13th century holy site in the protected area of Prizren.” March 2025. <https://kossev.info/without-soc-s-consent-illegal-construction-on-13th-century-holy-site-in-prizren-protected-zone/>.

221 Government of the Republic of Serbia. “Efforts to destroy Serbian cultural and spiritual heritage in Kosovo and Metohija must be prevented.” March 2025. <https://www.srbija.gov.rs/vest/en/244684/attempt-to-destroy-serbian-cultural-spiritual-heritage-in-kosovo-and-metohija-must-be-prevented.php?>

222 Pravda. “Serbian Prime Minister Calls for the Protection of Orthodox Shrines in Kosovo and Metohija.” March 2025. <https://albania.news-pravda.com/world/2025/03/07/2913.html>.

223 Pravda. “This is what 90% of Serbian cemeteries in Kosovo and Metohija look like today.” October 2025. <https://slova-ki.news-pravda.com/world/2025/10/08/199568.html>.

There have been cases of [damaged \(archives\)](#)²²⁴ cemeteries in Kosovo that have been handled by the Kosovo Police, but the claim that 90% of the cemeteries are damaged is false and unsupported.

For and Against Muslims and Catholics

Monitoring indicates that religiously motivated attacks have also been used by various social media pages to further certain narratives. No information is available on who manages these pages or from where they are administered. These social media pages have posts that are directed solely against one community, presenting them as collaborators and an extended arm of Serbia. The aim of these disinformation efforts is to undermine interfaith harmony and incite religious tensions.

For example, in various posts, attempts are made to link Renaissance figures and other national figures with religious issues (see [here](#)²²⁵ and [here](#)²²⁶). There were posts that exalted the figure and work of Gjergj Kastrioti-Skënderbeg, while others describe him as Russian. A page named “[Alternativa Arnaute](#)” posted a [still \(archive\)](#)²²⁷ taken from the film “Skënderbeg,” alongside

a portrait of the actor Akaki Khorava, with the inscription, “This is a Russian. Russia gave many things to Albania. One of them is Skënderbeg. But, according to historian [Bedri Muhadri](#),²²⁸ Gjergj Kastrioti-Skënderbeg [was Albanian](#),²²⁹ that is arbër.”

There were posts that smeared Muslim clerics, representing them as skeletons or singing songs for New Years (see [here](#),²³⁰ [here](#),²³¹ and [here](#)²³²). Imam Shefqet Krasniqi, because of his [calls not to celebrate New Years](#),²³³ was portrayed as a [Santa Clause](#).²³⁴ False narratives against Muslim clerics have also been shared on various Facebook profiles, calling them [all Muslims against Albanians](#)²³⁵ ([archive](#)) or by making false claims about specific imams (see [here](#)²³⁶ / [archive](#) and [here](#)²³⁷ / [archive](#)).

The TikTok page [Rilindja.Albanian](#) portrayed Catholics as Serbs working against the state of Kosovo. This page [falsely linked the attack in Banjska to the Catholic Church](#),²³⁸ and made [posts](#)²³⁹ about how Catholics marry Serbs. A page on [TikTok](#)²⁴⁰ published a video claiming that since the immediate post-war period, no Albanian priest has ever visited the ‘Adem Jashari’ memorial complex in Prekaz.

The claim was [completely false](#)²⁴¹ since the Bishop of Kosovo and several priests have [visited](#)²⁴² Prekaz and the Jashari Memorial Complex several times.

224 Voice of America. “Kosovo: Serb cemeteries in Lipjan were damaged.” July 2019. <https://www.zeriamerikes.com/a/kosovo-cemetery/4999889.html>.

225 Tiktok account. <https://www.tiktok.com/@albanian.kristian>.

226 Tiktok account. <https://www.tiktok.com/@rilindja.shqiptare>.

227 Alternativa Arnaute. <https://drive.google.com/file/d/1I77mW4WKvGI01joVdOh-EqvO-SS5LIYz/view>.

228 Biography. <https://ih-rks.org/biografia/BedriMuhadri.pdf>.

229 Academy of Sciences of Albania. <http://asa.edu.al/site/?p=4425>.

230 Tiktok post. https://www.tiktok.com/@allfobia/video/7584501331113594124?is_from_webapp=1&sender_device=p-c&web_id=7372472758708110853.

231 Tiktok post. https://www.tiktok.com/@albanian.kristian/video/7347649048771382561?_r=1&_t=ZM-92g71URuoQ8.

232 Tiktok post. <https://www.tiktok.com/@allfobia/video/7583749591112109368?q=Shefqet%20Krasniqi%20arab&t=1767176718833>.

233 Tiktok post. <https://www.tiktok.com/@rilindasit/video/7183560227185364229?q=Shefqet%20Krasniqi%20arab&t=1767176718833>.

234 Tiktok post. https://www.tiktok.com/@allfobia/video/7584501331113594124?is_from_webapp=1&web_id=7372472758708110853.

235 Video on Facebook. <https://www.facebook.com/share/v/1DC1LpDqmE/>.

236 Facebook video. <https://www.facebook.com/reel/1613951633085651>.

237 Facebook video. <https://www.facebook.com/reel/25863765049948765>.

238 Krypometër. “The unfounded connection of the attack in Banjska with the Catholic Church and the Deçan Movement.” Kallxo.com. November 2025. <https://kallxo.com/krypometer/nderlidhja-e-pabazuar-e-sulmit-ne-banjske-me-kishen-katolike-dhe-levizjen-e-decanit/>.

239 Tiktok account. <https://www.tiktok.com/@rilindja.shqiptare>.

240 Tiktok account, archived. <https://drive.google.com/file/d/1zUrWVBLXNPZXBz21QAOadLUf0-puhVNw/view>.

241 Krypometër. “The lie that the Catholic Church and priests have never visited Prekaz.” Kallxo.com. February 2026. <https://kallxo.com/krypometer/rrena-se-kisha-katolike-dhe-prifterinjte-nuk-e-kane-vizituar-asnjehere-prekazin/>.

242 Catholic Church. <https://www.kishakatolike.org/?cid=1,13,45#:~:text=After the bishop and his collaborators, the sacrifice of these.>

ELECTIONS THROUGH THE EYES OF THE KREMLIN AND BELGRADE

The period from 1 September 2025 to 1 March 2026 marked one of the most intense political phases in Kosovo's recent history, generating a large volume of information. Within just a few months, three electoral processes took place—the first and second rounds of the local elections and the early parliamentary elections held on 28 December 2025.

This concentrated election cycle created a sensitive information environment, where political competition, interethnic tensions, and geopolitical interests overlapped with a noticeable rise in disinformation. In such contexts, democratic processes often become targets of coordinated information manipulation campaigns.

Monitoring of media content during this period shows that Kosovo's information ecosystem was exposed to a range of disinformation narratives aimed at undermining trust in democratic institutions, the electoral process, and the role of international actors in the country. A significant portion of these narratives was spread through Russian media and platforms linked to the Kremlin's propaganda network, which consistently portrayed Kosovo as an illegitimate state and its institutions as tools of oppression against the Serbian community.

These narratives did not focus only on elections but extended to other sensitive issues as well, such as security matters and espionage-related arrests, which were selectively interpreted to reinforce propagandistic messaging. In this way, disinformation was used as a tool to shape public perception and construct an alternative version of Kosovo's political and institutional reality.

Attempts to Delegitimize Elections

As argued by EUvsDisinfo, one of Russia's key objectives is to delegitimize elections held in democratic countries. Russia has applied different strategies across various countries, attempting to influence power structures and favor parties aligned with Kremlin interests. Such disinformation campaigns have been particularly visible in elections in Romania and Moldova, with attempts also noted in Germany and at the EU level. Kosovo has not been immune to these efforts.

Kremlin-controlled media increased their activity during election periods in Kosovo. Monitoring results show that four Kremlin-linked outlets: Sputnik Serbia, Russia Today Balkan, the Pravda network, and the Russian News Agency TASS, published a total of 1,323 articles about Kosovo, averaging about 7.3 articles per day between 1 September 2025 and 1 March 2026. Many of these articles focused on the elections, serving as channels for spreading Kremlin narratives and disinformation.

In disinformation articles published in Pravda, the elections in Kosovo were presented as illegitimate ([archive](#)).²⁴³ This narrative is false as the elections in Kosovo were held based on the Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo and the Law on Elections and were widely observed by local and international organizations which assessed them as free and democratic (see

243 Pravda. "Fake elections." Pressure is being put on Serbs again. While EU representatives are talking about "democracy and reforms", the "Kosovo" authorities are preparing for the elections on October 12 according to the old scheme, through fear." October 2025. <https://albania.news-pravda.com/world/2025/10/08/4572.html>.

[here](#)²⁴⁴ and [here](#)²⁴⁵).

Pravda has attempted to contest the elections in Kosovo by attacking [EULEX and NATO](#), ([archive](#))²⁴⁶ two international missions they have portrayed as mechanisms for suppressing discontent and blamed for not maintaining security in Kosovo and helping the Kosovo Government [persecute Serbs](#).²⁴⁷ In reality, [KFOR is NATO's mission in Kosovo](#)²⁴⁸ committed to helping maintain a safe and secure environment and freedom of movement for all people and communities in Kosovo. Today, [KFOR](#)²⁴⁹ consists of approximately 4,500 troops sent from 33 allied and partner countries to Kosovo. This mission has been in Kosovo since June 1999 because of a UN Security Council Resolution, which was also supported by Russia as one of the members with veto power in the Council.

The role of the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo ([EULEX Kosovo](#))²⁵⁰ is to support Kosovo's rule of law institutions in improving their effectiveness, sustainability, multi-ethnicity, and accountability, free from political interference and fully aligned with international human rights standards and European best practices. This is done through monitoring, mentoring, and advising activities, while the mission also retains limited executive functions.

[Russia Today Balkan](#)²⁵¹ ([archive](#)) wrote that KFOR conducted shooting exercises on the day of the local elections, presenting this as an act intended to intimidate Serbian citizens. This was denied by KFOR through a [media release](#)²⁵² issued on 12 October 2025.

KFOR [announced](#)²⁵³ that these trainings are regular and essential to maintain high operational capabilities and to keep KFOR troops ready to respond quickly and effectively to any potential security challenge. KFOR [stated](#)²⁵⁴ that these exercises foster the coordination necessary to fulfill KFOR's mission of a secure environment in Kosovo. In their [statement](#)²⁵⁵ they did not disclose that the training exercises were related to the elections or that they were conducted in Prishtina.

One of the aims of the disinformation published in Kremlin-controlled media was to portray the Serbian List as the only party that protects the interests of Serbian citizens (see [here/ archive](#),²⁵⁶ [here](#)²⁵⁷ [archive](#), and [here](#)²⁵⁸ / [archive](#)). At the same time, data shows that the numerous articles published in Russian media aimed to discredit other Serbian parties by not mentioning them at all in the reports or by calling them pawns of the Kurti Government (see [here/ archive](#),²⁵⁹ and [here/ archive](#)²⁶⁰).

244 DW. "Observers: Elections in Kosovo are inclusive and peaceful." February 2025. <https://www.dw.com/sq/v%C3%ABzh-guesit-zgjedhjet-n%C3%AB-kosov%C3%AB-gjith%C3%ABp%C3%ABrfshir%C3%ABse-dhe-paq%C3%ABsore/a-71567898>.

245 Democracy in Action. "Election Observation Report for the Assembly of Kosovo." February 2025. <https://kdi-kosova.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/06/05-Raporti-5-Raport-i-Vezhgimit-te-Zgjedhjeve-per-Kuvendin-e-Kosoves-WEB-ALB-01.pdf>.

246 Pravda. "Elections without choices." September 2025. <https://albania.news-pravda.com/world/2025/09/28/4486.html>.

247 Ibid.

248 NATO. NATO's role in Kosovo. <https://www.nato.int/en/what-we-do/operations-and-missions/natos-role-in-kosovo#-objectives>.

249 Ibid.

250 EULEX. "What is EULEX?" <https://www.eulex-kosovo.eu/?page=2,16>.

251 RT Balkan. "Local elections in Kosovo and Metohija: "Serbs take back their municipalities, Serb List at the top." October 2025. <https://rt.rs/srbija-i-balkan/159831-kim-izbori-srbi/>.

252 NATO Kosovo Force, statement on Facebook. <https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=1299799968136125>.

253 BIRN Kosovo (2023). "The Vortex of Lies." <https://kallxo.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/VORBULLA-E-RRENAVE-FI-NALE.pdf>.

254 Ibid.

255 Ibid.

256 Pravda. "Fake elections." October 2025. <https://albania.news-pravda.com/world/2025/10/08/4572.html>.

257 Sputnik. "What do Serbs from Kosovo and Metohija expect from the local elections?" October 2025. <https://sputnik-portal.rs/20251012/sta-srbi-sa-severa-kosova-i-metohije-ocekiju-od-lokalnih-izbora-1191284217.html>.

258 RT Balkan. "Petković for local elections in Kosovo and Metohija: Let's defeat and remove the fake Albanian leaders from the north." October 2025. <https://lat.rt.rs/srbija-i-balkan/159361-lokalni-izbori-kim-petar-petkovic-srpska-lista/>.

259 Sputnik. "At midnight, the Serbian List launched the campaign for local elections in Kosovo and Metohija." September 2025. <https://sputnikportal.rs/20250913/srpska-lista-u-ponoc-pocela-kampanju-za-lokalne-izbore-na-kosovu-i-metohiji9.html>.

260 RT Balkan. "Local elections in Kosovo and Metohija: "Serbs take back their municipalities, Serb List at the top." October 2025. <https://rt.rs/srbija-i-balkan/159831-kim-izbori-srbi/>.

But the truth is different from what is presented in the Russian media. Several [Serb parties and initiatives](#) were certified to run in the Kosovo elections.²⁶¹ The narrative reported during the election period, that Serbs are experiencing an “existential struggle,” was also pushed by the [Sputnik Serbia](#) platform ([archive](#)),²⁶² who describe electoral participation as a defining conflict for the Serbian community in Kosovo. The article focuses on the attempt to present voting for the Serbian List as an act of resistance against assimilation.

The narrative that Kosovo is an illegitimate state that oppresses Serbs and manipulates elections was pushed further on election day. [Collective voting of Serbs](#) ([archive](#))²⁶³ was glorified, while the Central Election Commission, CEC, was accused of election manipulation after failing to accredit several Serbian media outlets to observe the local elections held on 12 October 2025. Institutions were subsequently attacked for not reacting to this CEC decision. It should be noted that Russian networks did not report that [the CEC then withdrew](#)²⁶⁴ the decision not to accredit the media outlets and that several Albanian-language media outlets were also denied accreditation. The Serbian List leading in nine out of ten municipalities with a Serb majority [was presented by Russia Today Balkan](#) ([archive](#))²⁶⁵ as a restoration of Serb control in these municipalities.

The CEC’s “Political Game” Exploited by the Kremlin to Spread Disinformation Narratives

In three consecutive electoral processes, the Central Election Commission (CEC) did not certify the Serb List on its first attempt. The first case occurred ahead of the parliamentary elections in February 2025. The same scenario was repeated in the local elections in October 2025 and again in the electoral process of December 2025. The CEC’s decision was criticized by international diplomats (see [here](#)²⁶⁶ and [here](#)²⁶⁷). These decisions were appealed and overturned by the Electoral Complaints and Appeals Panel, ECAP, which found that there was insufficient legal basis to exclude the Serb List from the electoral race.

The CEC’s attempt to prevent the Serb List from participating in the elections was used by the Russian government to reinforce its narrative that the Government of Kosovo is seeking to persecute Serbs. A few days after the elections the Spokesperson of Russia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, [Maria Zakharova](#)²⁶⁸ ([archive](#)), claimed that the Serb List had faced difficult conditions and heavy pressure, “being denied registration, having journalists denied accreditation, and having representatives expelled from election commissions.” However, Russian media did not report on the legal procedures available to parties to appeal CEC decisions, nor on the ECAP ruling—an institutional mechanism that proved effective in ensuring a sound democratic process.

261 Central Election Commission. 50th Meeting: The CEC certifies the fourth group of 33 political entities and 4,913 candidates for the 2025 Local Elections. <https://kqz-ks.org/mbledhja-e-50-te-kqz-certifikon-grupin-e-katert-me-33-subjekte-politike-dhe-4913-kandidate-per-zheçjet-lokale-2025/>.

262 Sputnik. “Serbian List at the final convention in Zvecan: “Tomorrow we will fight for survival in the centuries-old chimneys.” October 2025. <https://lat.sputnikportal.rs/20251011/srpska-lista-na-zavrshnoj-konvenciji-u-zvecanu-sutra-se-bori-mo-za-opstanak-na-vekovnim-ognjstima-1191267320.html>.

263 Pravda. “Kosovo Histeria. Serbs dared to vote. “Kosovo authorities” are trying to prevent Serbs from voting in local elections.” October 2025. <https://albania.news-pravda.com/world/2025/10/12/4593.html>.

264 [Kallxo.com](#). “KJA: “Media outlets rejected the day before by the CEC for covering the local elections are now accredited.” October 2025. <https://kallxo.com/lajm/agk-akreditohen-mediat-e-refuzuara-nje-dite-me-pare-nga-kqz-ja-per-perceljelljen-e-zgjevjje-lokale/>.

265 RT Balkan. ““Local elections in Kosovo and Metohija: “Serbs take back their municipalities, Serb List at the top.” October 2025. <https://rt.rs/srbija-i-balkan/159831-kim-izbori-srbi/>.

266 [Kallxo.com](#). “British Ambassador on the non-certification of the Serbian List: An action that damages Kosovo’s relations with close partners.” December, 2025 <https://kallxo.com/lajm/ambasadori-britanik-per-moscertifikimin-e-listes-serbe-ve-prim-qe-demton-marredheniet-e-kosoves-me-partneret-e-ngushte/>.

267 [Kallxo.com](#). “EU Office after non-certification of the Serb List: The politicization of the CEC is detrimental to an inclusive electoral process.” December, 2025 <https://kallxo.com/lajm/zyra-e-be-se-pas-moscertifikimit-te-listes-serbe-politizimi-i-kqz-se-eshte-i-demshem-per-nje-proces-zgjedhor-gjithperfishires/>.

268 Pravda. “Response of the official representative of the Russian Foreign Ministry, Mikhail Zakharova, to a question from the media regarding the results of the municipal elections in Kosovo (October 17, 2025).” October 2025. <https://albania.news-pravda.com/russia/2025/10/17/4632.html>.

The Election Complaints and Appeals Panel, ECAP, [ordered](#)²⁶⁹ the Central Election Commission to certify the Serb List for the local elections of 12 October, just as it had [done](#)²⁷⁰ for the elections held on 28 December 2025.

Furthermore, the [removal of the inscription “Kosovska Mitrovica” \(archive\)](#)²⁷¹ in North Mitrovica was linked to the electoral process and reported as part of Kurti’s campaign to remove Serbs from political participation. The official name of the municipality is Mitrovica North, while the name “Kosovska Mitrovica” was used during the Milošević regime in Kosovo. After the elections, the [Kosovo Police issued a press release](#)²⁷² stating that no serious incidents were recorded that day. [The Russian news agency, TASS \(archives\)](#),²⁷³ reported on the statement, noting that the elections were conducted without major incidents.

269 Radio Free Europe. “ECAP orders CEC to certify Serb List for local elections.” August 2025. <https://www.evropaelire.org/a/pzap-certifikimi-lista-serbe-/33511627.html>.

270 Kallxo.com. “ECAP approves the appeal of the Serb List, and certifies them for early parliamentary elections.” December, 2025 <https://kallxo.com/lajm/pzap-e-aprovon-ankesen-e-listes-serbe-certifikohet-per-zgjedhjet-e-parakohshme-parlamentare/>.

271 Pravda. “Their war.” October 2025. <https://albania.news-pravda.com/world/2025/10/02/4532.html>.

272 Kallxo.com. “The police considers that the electoral process took place peacefully and without serious incidents.” October 2025. <https://kallxo.com/lajm/policia-vlereson-se-procesi-zgjedhor-u-zhvillua-i-qete-dhe-pa-incidente-serioze/>.

273 TASS. “Kosovo Police reported that the elections were held without serious incidents.” October 2025. <https://tass.ru/mezhdunarodnaya-panorama/25323965>.

DISINFORMATION DURING ELECTION PERIODS

During the election campaign in Kosovo, women in politics and other public figures became targets of disinformation through false quotes, photo manipulations, and AI-generated videos.

Such posts attributed fabricated statements to public figures, portraying them either as supporters of certain parties or as national traitors. This manipulative campaign was aimed at personal defamation and at inciting hatred and division, in order to undermine public trust in institutions and democratic processes. From local candidates to top state leaders, disinformation sought to influence public perception and discredit the role of women and experts in politics.

Use of Artificial Intelligence

During the election campaigns for the local and parliamentary elections held at the end of 2025, there was a noticeable increase in the use of artificial intelligence to manipulate information, mainly through fabricated or altered videos and images. These materials were published by

various Facebook and TikTok pages, often with unclear origins or management. The fabricated content included deepfake videos, doctored photographs, and altered audio portraying public figures in situations that never occurred. These materials were primarily used to construct false narratives about political ties, fabricated statements, or staged events, with the aim of discrediting public figures and influencing citizens' perceptions during politically sensitive periods.

Analysis of verified cases shows that AI-based manipulation was used to simulate non-existent meetings between political leaders (see [here](#)²⁷⁴ and [here](#)²⁷⁵), to modify statements in different languages (see [here](#),²⁷⁶ [here](#),²⁷⁷ and [here](#)²⁷⁸), to fabricate arrest videos or to create fake news that imitates the format of professional media (see [here](#),²⁷⁹ [here](#),²⁸⁰ and [here](#)²⁸¹). The dissemination of such content occurred mainly on social media platforms like Facebook and TikTok, where visual content has high viral potential and is more difficult for the public to verify.

274 Krypometër. "Fabricated video of President Osmani's meeting with President Trump." Kallxo.com. October, 2025. <https://kallxo.com/krypometer/video-e-fabrikuar-per-takimin-e-presidentes-osmani-me-presidentin-trump/>.

275 Krypometër. "The doctored photo of Osmani and Kurti holding the flag of the former Yugoslavia." November, 2025. <https://kallxo.com/krypometer/fotografia-e-manipuluar-e-osmanit-dhe-kurtit-duke-mbajtur-ne-duar-flamurin-e-ish-jugosl-lavise/>.

276 Krypometër. "Altered video, falsely claiming that Dimal Basha spoke in the Romani language." December, 2025 <https://kallxo.com/krypometer/video-e-manipuluar-permes-se-ciles-pretendohet-rrejshem-se-dimal-basha-ka-folur-ne-gjuhen-rome/>.

277 Krypometër. "The fabricated photo of Kurti with Vučić and Sešelj." Kallxo.com. December, 2025 <https://kallxo.com/krypometer/fotografia-e-fabrikuar-e-kurtit-me-vuciqin-dhe-sheshelin/>.

278 Krypometër. "The doctored photo of Osmani and Kurti holding the flag of the former Yugoslavia." November, 2025. <https://kallxo.com/krypometer/fotografia-e-manipuluar-e-osmanit-dhe-kurtit-duke-mbajtur-ne-duar-flamurin-e-ish-jugosl-lavise/>.

279 Krypometër. "Fabricated videos falsely portraying migrants to be talking about parliamentary elections." Kallxo.com. December, 2025 <https://kallxo.com/krypometer/video-te-fabrikuara-qe-rrejshem-paraqesin-mergimtare-duk-fole-per-zgjedhjet-parlamentare/>.

280 Krypometër. "The lie that the Police have seized millions of euros from Fatmir Limaj's house." Kallxo.com. October, 2025. <https://kallxo.com/krypometer/pretendimi-i-rreme-per-perfshirjen-e-opozites-ne-sulmin-ne-banjske/>.

281 Krypometër. "The fabricated photo of Kurti with Vučić and Sešelj." Kallxo.com. December, 2025 <https://kallxo.com/krypometer/fotografia-e-fabrikuar-e-kurtit-me-vuciqin-dhe-sheshelin/>.

These cases demonstrate that artificial intelligence is increasingly being used as a tool for producing sophisticated disinformation. Its use in manipulating visual and audio content poses a serious challenge to information integrity and public trust in political and media discourse.

Disinformation Targeting Women in Politics

Women involved in public and political life have been among the primary targets of coordinated attacks using false information and digital manipulation. They have been targeted through fabrications aimed at personal defamation, character assassination, and undermining their professional credibility. The use of advanced technologies, such as artificial intelligence and sophisticated editing, reflects a deliberate strategy to incite hate speech and diminish the role of women in decision-making.

This manipulative strategy has affected all levels of political representation, including local electoral contests. One example is a fabricated [post](#)²⁸² on Facebook which claimed that the mayoral candidate for Deçan, Natyra Kuçi, had withdrawn from the race to support her opponent Bashkim Ramosaj (AAK). This disinformation was circulated with the clear intent of misleading and discouraging voters at a time when Kuçi was actively campaigning to unseat Ramosaj.

MP Hykmete Bajrami was one of the most frequent targets of compounded manipulation. She was [falsely](#)²⁸³ attributed statements like “[Serbia is a reliable partner](#).”²⁸⁴ This attack was further escalated through AI generated deepfake videos (see [here](#)²⁸⁵ and [here](#)²⁸⁶) which aimed to portray her as a traitor with links to the Serb List. Similarly, to distort public messaging, a photograph of MP Janina Ymeri (LDK) was [manipulated](#),²⁸⁷ adding denigrating language to a banner in the background, attributing to her words she never used.

These smear campaigns also targeted people at the highest levels of government and diplomatic institutions. One such attack directly targeted the Presidency through a [doctored photograph](#)²⁸⁸ in which President Vjosa Osmani’s face was superimposed onto a 2019 image alongside former Serbian Prime Minister Ana Brnabić—a photomontage clearly designed to provoke negative reactions and resentment among citizens. In the same vein of trivializing high-level figures, Minister of Foreign Affairs Donika Gërvalla was victim to [audio-visual manipulation](#).²⁸⁹ In a video where she originally performed with a guitar, the original audio was removed and replaced with a song containing lyrics promoting narcotics and weapons, aiming to degrade her image as chief diplomat.

282 Krypometër. “Natyra Kuçi is Bashkim Ramosaj’s counter-candidate in the race for Deçan.” Kallxo.com. September 2025. <https://kallxo.com/krypometer/natyra-kuci-eshte-kunderkandidate-e-bashkim-ramosajt-ne-garen-per-decan/>.

283 Krypometër. “Hykmete Bajrami did not say, “Serbia is a reliable partner.” Kallxo.com. September 2025. <https://kallxo.com/krypometer/hykmete-bajrami-nuk-ka-thene-serbine-e-kam-partnere-te-besueshme/>.

284 Facebook post, archived. <https://archive.ph/imNNi>.

285 Krypometër. “Artificial intelligence manufacturing: Hykmete Bajrami is the target of a fake video.” November 2025. <https://kallxo.com/krypometer/fabrikimi-me-inteligjence-artificiale-hykmete-bajrami-shenjester-e-nje-videoje-te-rreme/>.

286 Krypometër. “Fabricated video of Hykmete Bajrami speaking in Serbian.” Kallxo.com. November 2025. <https://kallxo.com/krypometer/video-e-fabrikuar-e-hykmete-bajramit-duke-folur-ne-gjuhen-serbe/>.

287 Krypometër. “The doctored photo of MP Janina Ymeri.” Kallxo.com. February 2026.. <https://kallxo.com/krypometer/fotografia-e-manipuluar-e-deputetes-janina-ymeri/>.

288 Krypometër. “Manipulation of the photo of Kosovo President Vjosa Osmani - as if she was photographed with the Serbian Prime Minister.” Kallxo.com. December, 2025 <https://kallxo.com/krypometer/manipulimi-i-fotografise-se-presidentes-se-kosoves-vjosa-osmani-kinse-eshte-fotografuar-me-kryeministren-serbe/>.

289 Krypometër. “False: Donika Gërvalla’s video is doctored.” Kallxo.com . December, 2025 <https://kallxo.com/krypometer/e-rreme-manipulohet-videoja-e-donika-gervalles/>.

More recently, digital manipulation has been continuously used as a tool to distort political positions and provoke internal party divisions. MP Ganimete Musliu (PDK) was targeted through two different methods: an audio track was superimposed onto an [existing video to falsely suggest she was chanting Albin Kurti's name](#),²⁹⁰ and a [completely fabricated image](#)²⁹¹ showed her posing with U.S. President Donald Trump. This tactic of inciting hostility was also applied to another PDK MP, Blerta Deliu, who [was attributed a fabricated statement](#)²⁹² criticizing former President Hashim Thaçi—clearly designed to create confusion and internal discord within her party and among its supporters. Beyond character assassination, these fabrications have also sought to entangle women politicians in dangerous national security narratives. PDK Secretary General Vlora Çitaku was [falsely attributed statements](#)²⁹³ suggesting she had prior knowledge of the terrorist attack in Banjska—[an entirely unfounded claim](#)²⁹⁴ created solely to portray her as complicit in undermining state security.

Smearing Public Figures as “National Traitors” and Collaborators with Serbia

During the campaign period for the local and snap parliamentary elections in Kosovo, one of the most commonly used disinformation tactics was the smearing of public figures and candidates as “national traitors” or collaborators with Serbia and the Serb List. This strategy targeted nearly all major political parties—including LVV, LDK, PDK, and AAK—through the dissemination of false information about alleged secret coalitions with the Serb List, meetings with Milan Radoičić, or covert agreements to divide Kosovo.

To advance the “traitor” narrative, manipulated images and AI-generated videos were used to depict politicians in situations that never occurred. The aim was to influence citizens’ perceptions and construct a false narrative that major Albanian parties were cooperating with Serbia for political and territorial interests.

Lëvizja Vetëvendosje and its members were targeted by several false posts linking them to Serbia and the Serb List. [Fabricated images](#)²⁹⁵ were published showing Prime Minister Albin Kurti with Milan Radoičić, as well as [manipulated photos](#)²⁹⁶ portraying Kurti wearing a red beret with Serbian nationalist symbols. A TikTok account publishing exclusively in Serbian posted several fake videos [falsely claiming](#)²⁹⁷ that Kurti was speaking Serbian and echoing Serbian narratives.

290 Krypometër. “Fabricated video: Ganimete Musliu is falsely portrayed as having cheered ‘Albin Kurti.’” Kallxo.com. January 2026. <https://kallxo.com/krypometer/video-e-fabrikuar-ganimete-musliun-e-paraqesin-rrejshem-kinse-ka-brohoritur-albin-kurti/>.

291 Krypometër. “The doctored photo of Ganimete Musliu with Donald Trump.” Kallxo.com. February 2026. <https://kallxo.com/krypometer/fotografia-e-manipuluar-e-ganimete-musliut-me-donald-trumpin/>.

292 Krypometër. “Statement about Hashim Thaçi falsely accusing MP Blerta Deliu.” Kallxo.com. February 2026.. <https://kallxo.com/krypometer/deklarata-per-hashim-thacin-qe-i-mvishet-rrejshem-deputetes-blerta-deliu/>.

293 Tiktok post, archived. <https://web.archive.org/web/20251012133009/>

294 Krypometër. “False allegations about Ramush Haradinaj and Vlora Çitaku.” October 2025. <https://kallxo.com/krypometer/pretendime-te-rreme-per-ramush-haradinajn-dhe-vlora-citakun/>.

295 Krypometër. “Fabricated photo of Kurti with Radoicic.” Kallxo.com. December, 2025 <https://kallxo.com/krypometer/fotografia-e-fabrikuar-e-kurtit-me-radoicicqin/>.

296 Krypometër. “The fabricated photo of Kurti with a red beret and Serbian nationalist symbols.” Kallxo.com. October 2025. <https://kallxo.com/krypometer/fotografia-e-fabrikuar-e-kurtit-me-berete-te-kuqe-dhe-simbole-nacionaliste-serbe/>.

297 Krypometër. “Series of fabricated videos depicting Kurti echoing in Serbian the narrative of Serbia.” Kallxo.com. November 2025. <https://kallxo.com/krypometer/seri-e-video-te-fabikuara-qe-paraqesin-kurtin-duke-folur-ne-gjuhen-serbe-narrativen-e-serbise/>.

Moreover, [manipulated images](#)²⁹⁸ were circulated linking Kurti to Oliver Ivanovic, along with [false claims](#)²⁹⁹ that Radoicic had thanked Kurti for his support—claims that were later confirmed to be fabricated videos.

In one case, a [false claim](#)³⁰⁰ circulated widely alleging that the main opposition parties had secretly signed a coalition agreement with the Serb List. To reinforce this narrative, a fabricated article headline [falsely claimed](#)³⁰¹ that suspects in the terrorist attack in Banjska had testified that they had “acted on orders from opposition parties to bring down the Kurti government.” This was a dangerous and entirely unfounded manipulation, created solely to associate the opposition with threats to national security.

Additionally, a [fabricated video](#)³⁰² depicted leaders Memli Krasniqi, Lumir Abdixhiku, and Ramush Haradinaj as if delivering speeches in Serbian inside the Assembly of Kosovo. The video was generated using artificial intelligence. More recently, a [fabricated post](#)³⁰³ claimed that Fatmir Limaj had proposed a large pre-election coalition between PDK, LDK, AAK, Nisma, and the Serb List. This too was debunked as a complete falsehood, clearly designed to create confusion around pre-election political alliances.

The objective of these campaigns was to create the perception of widespread and concealed betrayal, manipulating citizens and undermining trust in democratic processes. The dissemination of these disinformation narratives through social media platforms such as Facebook and TikTok—

via fabricated images, videos, and quotes—served to tarnish the reputation of political figures and deliberately shape public perception. In this way, the campaign period was marked by the systematic use of visually and textually manipulated materials, affecting political parties, candidates, state figures, and citizens alike, and increasing the risk of division and political confusion.

False Quotes and Misleading Attributions to Public Figures During the Campaign

During the election campaign period, the online space in Kosovo was marked by the spread of disinformation content aimed at influencing public perception and voters’ political orientation. One of the most frequent forms of manipulation was the [false attribution of statements to well-known public figures](#).³⁰⁴ These practices created confusion among the public and increased the risk of manipulating public debate during the electoral process.

High-profile public figures, such as former presidents Hashim Thaçi and [Atifete Jahjaga](#),³⁰⁵ former Prime Minister Isa Mustafa, former minister Arsim Bajrami, and analyst [Imer Mushkolaj](#),³⁰⁶ were targeted by posts falsely attributing to them statements of support for political parties.

298 Krypometër. “False statement and manipulated photo of Albin Kurti with Oliver Ivanovic.” Kallxo.com. September 2025. <https://kallxo.com/krypometer/deklarata-e-rreme-dhe-fotografia-e-manipuluar-e-albin-kurtit-me-oliver-ivanovic/>.

299 Krypometër. “Radoicic did not thank Kurti, the video is fabricated.” Kallxo.com. October 2025. <https://kallxo.com/krypometer/radoicic-nuk-e-ka-falenderuar-kurtin-video-eshte-e-fabrikuar/>.

300 Krypometër. “False claim of opposition involvement in the attack in Banjska.” Kallxo.com. October 2025. <https://kallxo.com/krypometer/pretendimi-i-rreme-per-perfshirjen-e-opozites-ne-sulmin-ne-banjske/>.

301 Ibid.

302 Krypometër. “Fabricated video falsely portraying political party leaders speaking Serbian.” November 2025. <https://kallxo.com/krypometer/video-e-fabrikuar-qe-rrejshem-paraqet-lideret-e-partive-politike-duke-folur-serbisht/>.

303 Krypometër. “Fake post: “Limaj has not proposed a pre-election coalition of PDK, LDK, AAK, Nisma and Serbian List.” November 2025. <https://kallxo.com/krypometer/postim-i-rreme-limaj-nuk-ka-propozuar-koalicion-parazgjedhor-pdk-ldk-aak-nisma-dhe-lista-serbe/>.

304 Krypometër. “Campaign manipulation through fabricated quotes from public figures.” December, 2025 <https://kallxo.com/krypometer/manipulimi-gjate-fushates-permes-citateve-te-fabrikuara-te-personaliteteve-publike/>.

305 Facebook post, archived. <https://archive.ph/6sQV2>.

306 Krypometër. “Imer Mushkolaj denies the false quote: It’s disinformation.” December, 2025 <https://kallxo.com/krypometer/imer-mushkolaj-demanton-citatin-e-rreme-eshte-dezinformat/>.

Hashim Thaçi, who is currently in pretrial detention in The Hague, was [falsely portrayed](#)³⁰⁷ as calling on voters to support Kurti—a statement he never made. Atifete Jahjaga and Arsim Bajrami also described such posts attributed to them as false and propagandistic. Former Prime Minister [Isa Mustafa](#)³⁰⁸ likewise denied having made any statements in support of Kurti and his government. These disinformation posts circulated during the campaign period for the snap parliamentary elections.

In another case, a false quote was attributed to analyst [Janusz Bugajski](#),³⁰⁹ who passed away in 2025, allegedly expressing an opinion on the political situation in Kosovo, thereby constructing a false narrative of political endorsement. Similarly, another false post claimed that European Union official [Peter Stano](#)³¹⁰ had stated that “Kosovo has met all the criteria.” This claim was false and misleading, as Stano had made no such statement. These cases demonstrate the systematic use of public figures and experts to manipulate public opinion through disinformation disseminated in critical political periods.

On Facebook and TikTok, images were [published](#)³¹¹ and shared which falsely claimed to depict large murals of politicians and journalists painted on buildings across cities in Kosovo. In reality, the murals were generated using artificial intelligence, and the captions were fabricated.

These posts aimed to create the impression of widespread public support for or opposition to certain figures.

In addition, there was a widespread campaign on social media with the publication of fake opinion polls allegedly showing the ranking of political parties. Various social media pages published such [fabricated polls](#)³¹² in the run-up to the local elections and the snap parliamentary elections held on 28 December 2025 (see [here](#),³¹³ [here](#),³¹⁴ and [here](#)³¹⁵). However, these polls contained contradictory figures. They cited fictitious companies and failed to specify methodology, sample size, margin of error, or time period—elements that are mandatory under the Law on Elections and the ICM rules regarding polls. Experts emphasize that credible polls must use systematic random sampling and neutral questioning.

These [fake polls](#)³¹⁶ are intended to create the impression of broad support for a particular party or candidate and to influence voters’ decision-making, thereby undermining the democratic process. Moreover, the widespread dissemination of such polls on social media has caused confusion and misleading debates, reducing public trust in official electoral information.

307 Facebook post, archived. <https://archive.ph/ii8PY>.

308 Krypometër. “The statement that is falsely attributed to Isa Mustafa.” December, 2025 <https://kallxo.com/krypometer/deklarata-qe-rrejshe-m-i-mveshet-isa-mustafes/>.

309 Krypometër. “Fake quote attributed to analyst Janusz Bugajski, who died in 2025.” February 2026.. <https://kallxo.com/krypometer/citati-i-rreme-qe-i-mvishet-analistit-janusz-bugajski-i-cili-ka-vdekur-ne-vitin-2025/>.

310 Krypometër. “Lie: Peter Stano did not say “Kosovo met all the criteria.” February 2026.. <https://kallxo.com/krypometer/rrene-peter-stano-nuk-ka-thene-kosova-permbushi-te-gjitha-kriteret/>.

311 Krypometër. “Photos generated with Artificial Intelligence are falsely claimed to be murals in cities across Kosovo.” November 2025. <https://kallxo.com/krypometer/fotografite-e-gjeneruara-me-inteligence-artificiale-rrejshe-pretendohet-se-jane-murale-neper-qytetet-e-kosoves/>.

312 Krypometër. “A series of fake polls are circulating ahead of the December 28 elections.” December, 2025 <https://kallxo.com/krypometer/seri-sondazhesh-te-rreme-qarkullojne-para-zgjedhjeve-te-28-dhjetorit/?fbclid=IwY2xjawO7vhNleHRuA2FlbQlxMAg>.

313 Facebook post, archived. <https://archive.ph/MMen8>.

314 Facebook post, archived. <https://archive.ph/Kobio>.

315 Facebook post, archived. <https://archive.ph/imNNi>.

316 Krypometër. “A series of fake polls are circulating ahead of the December 28 elections.” Kallxo.com. December, 2025 <https://kallxo.com/krypometer/seri-sondazhesh-te-rreme-qarkullojne-para-zgjedhjeve-te-28-dhjetorit/>.

DISCREDITING ANALYSTS AND JOURNALISTS

During the monitoring period, a case was identified where a real event was misinterpreted in order to construct a disinformation narrative on social media. Analysts are active participants in political debates in the country, and they have also been publicly criticized by Prime Minister Albin Kurti, who accused them of bias and taking sides (see [here](#)³¹⁷ and [here](#)³¹⁸). Later, similar accusations were made by the leader of LDK, Lumir Abdixhiku. Beyond such statements, analysts have also been targeted by false information aimed at discrediting them.

For example, a genuine news report from November 2025 about the arrest of a Serbian police officer and the confiscation of a significant amount of money was used by several Facebook pages to [falsely claim that the funds were intended for analysts in Kosovo](#).³¹⁹ However, the Police and the Prosecution in Mitrovica confirmed to Krypometër that there is no link between this sum of money and Kosovo analysts. In reality, the case was treated as a standard customs violation for failure to declare money at the border.

Analysts and journalists have repeatedly been targets of disinformation, mainly through manipulated images and videos generated using artificial intelligence.

In one post, it was [falsely claimed](#)³²⁰ that Visar Ymeri had stated on the Debat Plus show that, “it does not matter that the Serb List refers to Kosovo as Kosovo and Metohija and that it has accepted the state of Kosovo.” In the full program, Ymeri did not say this, nor did he mention the term “Kosovo and Metohija,” he merely explained that the Serb List has formally accepted the state of Kosovo by taking the oath as members of parliament.

In another case, it was claimed that the Klan Kosova portal had published an article titled “Fatmir Sheholli we are with you, stay strong,” implying that they had expressed solidarity with Sheholli, who was arrested on suspicion of espionage. However, [no such article was published on Klan Kosova’s official portal](#),³²¹ and the news director of Klan Kosova described it as false information.

In a video shared on several TikTok and Facebook pages, it was [falsely claimed](#)³²² that certain journalists and public figures from Kosovo had attended the wedding of Arkan’s son, presenting it as a real and exclusive event. However, [verification of the video](#)³²³ revealed that it was not related to Arkan’s son’s wedding, but was instead filmed at another wedding—that of the nephew of Leonard Kërquki, director of T7 Television—and has no connection to the individuals mentioned. The people appearing in the video publicly confirmed that they had not attended Arkan’s wedding, making it clear that the post was false and manipulative.

317 RTV Dukagjini. “Analysts respond to Albin Kurti after the ‘accusations’, here’s what they say...” <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jgXDYO-V0lw&t=478s>.

318 Sinjali. “From boycott to ‘journalists are liars’ – Kurti’s campaign against the media in two weeks.” <https://www.facebook.com/GazetaSinjali/posts/sa-i-p%C3%ABrket-%C3%A7ka-d%C3%ABgjoni-e-di-q%C3%AB-nuk-e-keni-kollaj-kur-r%C3%AB-ma-v%C3%ABshtir%C3%AB-me-i-ngu-laj/935481125376368/>.

319 Krypometër. “The false connection between the arrest of the Serbian police officer in Jarinje and the analysts.” November 2025. <https://kallxo.com/krypometer/nderlidhja-e-rreme-e-arrestimit-te-policit-te-serbise-ne-jarinje-dhe-analisteve/>.

320 Krypometër. “Declaration on the Serb List that is falsely attributed to Visar Ymeri.” September 2025. <https://kallxo.com/krypometer/deklarata-per-listen-serbe-qe-rrejshem-i-mvishet-visar-ymerit/>.

321 Krypometër. “False post on behalf of the Klan Kosova media outlet about the espionage suspect, Fatmir Sheholli.” October 2025. <https://kallxo.com/krypometer/postimi-i-rreme-ne-emer-te-mediumit-klan-kosoh-te-dyshuarit-per-piunazh-fatmir-sheholli/>.

322 Krypometër. “The false information that journalists were guests at Arkan’s son’s wedding.” October 2025. <https://kallxo.com/krypometer/rrena-se-gazetaret-ishin-mysafire-ne-dasmen-e-djalit-te-arkanit/>.

323 Ibid.

AMPLIFICATION OF DISINFORMATION NARRATIVES ABOUT THE PERSECUTION OF SERBS

One of the main pillars of the Kremlin’s narrative is the spread of disinformation and, at the same time, creation of panic among citizens that the Government of Kosovo, in cooperation with international institutions, aims to carry out ethnic cleansing—namely, to persecute Serbs from Kosovo. This false narrative is disseminated by Kremlin-controlled media whenever a routine incident occurs in Kosovo, a government decision is made, an action is taken, or a statement is issued by international institutions present in Kosovo. This narrative has been identified several times by the EU’s anti-disinformation platform EUvsDisinfo, as well as in two BIRN reports on disinformation monitoring in 2023 and 2025.

EUvsDisinfo notes that Russian media baselessly accuse the United States and NATO of waging war against Serbia [and of committing a “soft genocide” against the Serbian population in Kosovo \(archive\)](#),³²⁴ and more broadly [portray a complex situation that has persisted](#)³²⁵ despite [efforts by the EU](#)³²⁶ and the US to reduce tensions. [NATO—a frequent target](#)³²⁷ of Kremlin disinformation—has played no role in increasing these tensions. [NATO forces in Kosovo \(KFOR\)](#) have consistently contributed [to de-escalating](#)

[tensions](#)³²⁸ between communities, including [in August](#)³²⁹ and [December 2022](#),³³⁰ as well as during [the events of March 2004](#),³³¹ when UN and NATO forces attempted to contain clashes³³² between Serbs and Albanians, which resulted in 27 local fatalities and 11 injured peacekeepers. This disinformation claim is part of a [pro-Kremlin campaign aimed at blaming the West for the escalating tensions in Kosovo](#)³³³ in December 2022. Moreover, it serves to divert attention from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

324 Sputnik. “Kosovo: “Continuation of US and NATO aggression.” December, 2022 <https://tj.sputniknews.ru/20221212/kosovo-usa-nato-1053467594.html>.

325 AP News. “Explanatory: “Why do tensions continue between Kosovo and Serbia?” December, 2022 <https://apnews.com/article/politics-serbia-kosovo-european-union-aleksandar-vucic-cce01ee269c5a2a4a7e216936fd4a4a5>.

326 Radio Free Europe. “EU appeals for de-escalation in Kosovo, US sends representatives to Pristina after recent clashes.” December, 2022 <https://www.rferl.org/a/kosovo-clashes-de-escalation-us-envoys-eu/32172644.html>.

327 EUvsDisinfo. “NATO special representative: Global dictatorship and the liberation of all wars of the last 25 years.” April, 2019. <https://euvsdisinfo.eu/nato-special-global-dictatorship-and-unleashing-all-the-wars-of-the-last-25-years/>.

328 NATO. “NATO-led KFOR mission breaks down last barricades in northern Kosovo.” January 2023. <https://www.nato.int/en/news-and-events/articles/news/2023/01/05/nato-led-kfor-mission-dismantles-last-barricades-in-northern-kosovo>.

329 “US NATO troops are deployed at checkpoints in Kosovo.” August 2022. <https://english.alarabiya.net/News/world/2022/08/19/American-NATO-troops-deployed-at-check-points-in-Kosovo>.

330 Voice of America: “NATO investigates shooting incident in tense northern Kosovo.” December, 2022 <https://www.voanews.com/a/nato-probing-shooting-incident-in-tense-northern-kosovo/6892411.html>.

331 Balkan Insight. “Serbs Commemorate Victims of Deadly 2004 Unrest in Kosovo.” March 2022. <https://balkaninsight.com/2022/03/17/serbs-commemorate-victims-of-deadly-2004-unrest-in-kosovo/btj/>.

332 The Guardian. “Fourteen killed as ethnic violence sweeps Kosovo.” Mars 2004. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2004/mar/18/balkans>.

333 EUvsDisinfo. “The Kremlin’s ABC: Adjust the focus. Accuse others. Cancel events.” December, 2022 <https://euvsdisinfo.eu/kremlin-abc-adapt-focus-blame-others-cancel-events/>.

During the monitoring period (1 September 2025 – 1 March 2026), this disinformation narrative continued to appear in statements by Kremlin officials, political leaders in Serbia, and in numerous news reports published by media controlled by these two powers.

Misinterpreting Police Operations

An operation by the Special Prosecution of Kosovo was carried out on October 19, 2025 in several locations in two municipalities in the north of the country—Zubin Potok and Zvečan—as part of the investigation into the [killing of Audrius Senavicius, a Lithuanian customs officer](#)³³⁴ serving with the EULEX Mission, on 19 September 2013.

The Special Prosecution of the Republic of Kosovo announced that raids were conducted at two locations in Zvečan and seven locations in Zubin Potok, on suspicion of : endangering United Nations personnel or personnel associated with them, aggravated murder, and assault on an official person in the performance of official duties. The Prosecution stated that seven individuals were brought in for questioning during the operation and they were subsequently released after being interviewed.

However, this operation was reported by the Russian propaganda network “Pravda,” [known for disseminating disinformation](#)³³⁵ in more than [83 countries worldwide](#).³³⁶ “In the northern part of Kosovo, populated predominantly by Serbs, Albanian ‘security forces’ are carrying out raids with arrests of Serbs as a show of force,” read the headline of the article published in [Pravda \(archive\)](#).³³⁷

The [Pravda report](#),³³⁸ accompanied by footage from the Kosovo Police operation, was taken from the Telegram group “Кирилл Фёдоров / Война История Оружие”³³⁹ (Eng: Kirill Fyodorov / War History Weapons), which has around 500,000 members. This Telegram group is administered by Kirill Fyodorov, a Russian military blogger known for spreading disinformation about the war in Ukraine. Fyodorov was previously been [arrested](#)³⁴⁰ in Riga, Latvia, due to [pro-Kremlin activities, including support for, justification of, and glorification of Russian crimes in Ukraine](#).³⁴¹

In another case, several vKosovo Security Force (KSF) vehicles were seen in the municipality of North Mitrovica. However, both the KSF and the Kosovo Police clarified that this was due to a navigational error by a convoy traveling from Istog to the KSF barracks in Mitrovica. KFOR also [accepted the explanations](#)³⁴² provided by the KSF, noting that the unit had [mistakenly](#)³⁴³ entered North Mitrovica and that, “KFOR welcomes the continued compliance by the KSF with the agreement not to deploy KSF personnel in northern Kosovo without prior notification and approval from the KFOR Commander.”

334 Kallxo.com. “The Murder That Shook the North.” September 2013. <https://kallxo.com/gjate/vrasja-qe-rreqethi-veriun/>.

335 EUvsDisinfo, <https://euvsdisinfo.eu/?s=pravda>.

336 Edmo. “The Russian disinformation network ‘Pravda’ grew more in the EU, even after its discovery.” April, 2024. <https://edmo.eu/publications/russian-disinformation-network-pravda-grew-bigger-in-the-eu-even-after-its-uncovering/>.

337 Pravda. “In the northern part of Kosovo and Metohija, where the predominantly Serb population lives, Albanian ‘security forces’ carry out raids and arrests of Serbs as a show of force.” October 2025. <https://albania.news-pravda.com/nato/2025/10/20/4644.html> and <https://archive.ph/pieqA>.

338 Ibid.

339 Kirill Fyodorov / War History Weapons Group on Telegram. <https://t.me/s/warhistoryalconafter>.

340 Tass. “Russia demands the immediate release of blogger Kirill Fedorov in Latvia – diplomat.” March 2022. <https://tass.com/society/1425757>.

341 LSM.lv. “Latvian blogger accused of pro-Kremlin activity.” <https://eng.lsm.lv/article/society/crime/latvian-blogger-accused-of-pro-kremlin-activity.a495225/>.

342 Radio Free Europe. “KFOR: “We welcome the respect of the agreement for the deployment of the KSF in the north.” October 2025. <https://www.evropaelire.org/a/kfor-marrevshja-dislokim-fsk-ne-veri-33562363.html>.

343 Kallxo.com. “VIDEO: “KSF vehicles are seen in North Mitrovica, Police say they missed the road.” October 2025. <https://kallxo.com/lajm/video-vetura-te-fsk-se-shihen-ne-mitrovica-te-veriut-policia-thote-se-e-ngaterruan-rrugen/>.

Nevertheless, this incident was exploited by media outlets in Serbia and those controlled by the Kremlin to revive the disinformation narrative that the Kurti government, together with international actors, aims to [persecute Serbs in Kosovo](#).³⁴⁴ In Serbian media, the navigational error by the KSF was reported as “Albin Kurti’s new terror” and a “dangerous threat.”

The [Serbian outlet B92 \(archive\)](#)³⁴⁵ claimed that Kosovo’s acting Prime Minister Albin Kurti had sent “two trucks and four Humvee KSF vehicles” to the north. Similar reports appeared in the outlet [Naslovi \(archive\)](#),³⁴⁶ where an article—written in poor Albanian—carried the headline: “Albin Kurti’s new terror; Office for Kosovo and Metohija: ‘This is a dangerous threat’ – VIDEO.” Another Serbian outlet, [Pink.rs](#),³⁴⁷ reported that, “despite written guarantees that the Kosovo Security Force cannot be deployed in northern Kosovo and Metohija without prior consent from KFOR, this morning two trucks and four ‘Humvees’ belonging to the KSF were filmed at the entrance to northern Mitrovica, near a gas station.” Furthermore, [Telegraf.rs](#)³⁴⁸ ([archive](#)) reported that “Albin Kurti sent two trucks and four Humvees belonging to the Kosovo Security Force to northern Kosovo and Metohija.” Another article published by [Russia Today Balkans \(archive\)](#)³⁴⁹ carried the headline: “New provocation: A long convoy of the so-called KSF passes through northern Mitrovica, allegedly ‘took the wrong road.’”

In a correspondence with then NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen [in 2013](#),³⁵⁰ the then Prime Minister of Kosovo, Hashim Thaçi, committed that the KSF would not be deployed in the north—an area predominantly inhabited by ethnic Serbs—without prior agreement with NATO’s peacekeeping mission in Kosovo, KFOR. [Kosovo’s Minister of Defense, Ejup Maqedonci](#),³⁵¹ also sent a letter to the KFOR Commander last year, stating that its purpose was to clarify the circumstances surrounding the engagement of a KSF unit in one of the northern municipalities and to assure that there was no intention to escalate the situation under any circumstances.

344 Kallxo.com. “Two separate events that were interpreted by Russian and Serbian media as repression against Serbs.” October 2025. <https://kallxo.com/komuna/fact-check/dy-ngjarje-te-ndara-qe-u-interpretuan-nga-mediat-ruse-e-serbe-si-represion-ndaj-serbeve/>.

345 B92. “Albin Kurti’s new terror; Office for Kosovo and Metohija: ‘This is a dangerous threat’ VIDEO.” October 2025. <https://www.b92.net/info/kosovo/172948/novi-teror-aljbina-kurtija-kancelarija-za-kim-ovo-je-opasna-pretnja-video/vest> and <https://archive.ph/3RuAb>.

346 Naslovi. “Albin Kurti’s new terror; Office for Kosovo and Metohija: ‘This is a dangerous threat’ VIDEO.” October 2025. <https://naslovi.net/2025-10-16/b92/novi-teror-aljbina-kurtija-kancelarija-za-kim-ovo-je-opasna-pretnja-video/40682801> and <https://archive.ph/t4kB4>.

347 Pink.rs. “This is the official ban on KBS’s entry into the north - Kurti ignores the guarantees he himself signed!” <https://pink.rs/politika/730310/ovo-je-zvanicna-zabrana-ulaska-kbs-na-sever-kurti-ignorise-garancije-koje-je-sam-potpisao>.

348 Telegraf.rs. “Two trucks and four KBS Humvees captured in North Mitrovica!” Office for Kosovo and Metohija: “This is a dangerous threat.” October 2025. <https://www.telegraf.rs/vesti/politika/4198227-dva-kamiona-i-four-hamers-kbs-recorded-in-northern-mitrovica-office-for-who-is-this-a-dangerous-threat> and <https://archive.ph/aZHle>.

349 RT Balkan. “A new provocation: A convoy of the so-called KSF passed through North Mitrovica, supposedly took a ‘wrong turn’.” October 2025. <https://rt.rs/srbija-i-balkan/160305-kbs-severna-mitrovica-eljsani/> and <https://archive.ph/um3Gq>.

350 Letter from former NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen, dated 19 April 2013, addressed to Mr. Thaçi. https://gdb.rferl.org/D211707A-A171-4965-8F24-4E5A4F1ED5A1_w1597_n_r0_st.png.

351 Minister of Defense, Facebook post. <https://www.facebook.com/share/p/1Fk6XovyJP/>.

DISINFORMATION ABOUT CLIMATE CHANGE ON SOCIAL MEDIA

Although less prevalent, disinformation about global warming has also been published on social media.

As in other countries in the region and beyond, disinformation in Albanian about climate change aims to create confusion, provoke panic, undermine trust in scientific data, deny the existence of climate change, and even claim that global warming is an orchestrated hoax.

Most of the disinformation circulated in Albanian is an imitation or copy of narratives spread across Europe.

On Facebook, a group called [“Flat Earth Kosovo – Toka e Rrafshët Kosovë”](#)³⁵² shares claims that global warming does not exist and that it “is a great hoax.”

“Global warming naturally does not exist; for years a huge machine the size of three stadiums combined has been built, and it generates heat far stronger than the sun—Direct Energy Weapon,” read one claim published on 9 January 2024 in this group.

Over the years, conspiracy theories related to climate change have also circulated, largely promoted by Alfred Cako, a [conspiracy theorist](#)³⁵³ from Albania.

In one of his appearances, Cako [claimed](#)³⁵⁴ that, “all this melting of glaciers is a lie by environmentalists; [the temperature] has not increased at all, it is completely normal. These are just weather cycles influenced by various other factors and have no connection...”

He has made other similar posts, mainly challenging scientific studies on global warming.

[In another post](#)³⁵⁵ ([archive](#)), Cako questioned the existence of global warming by arguing that the melting of glaciers would not lead to rising sea and ocean levels:

“Let me ask these round-headed people whose heads keep spinning and who believe in global warming: if the ice melts, does the water level rise (as they tell us) or fall?! Think carefully and keep in mind two principles: 1) glaciers have about 5/7 of their volume underwater; 2) when water freezes, it expands in volume...”

He further mocked wildfires in Greece and questioned global warming by pointing to opposite climate phenomena occurring elsewhere.

Denial of Scientific Data

“Is God selectively burning Greece like this?! Only olive trees? Doesn’t care about the grass?! Ah, what global warming is doing to us!!! In Slovenia it’s snowing, in Italy there are floods and heavy rain, in Greece fruit trees are burning. Just wait until the same idiots and NGOs come here to demand stupid laws against keeping pets and to impose electric cars, banning fossil fuels!!! They once told us fossil fuels would run out in 30 years, and now they say they are harmful because they cause global warming and pollution!!” he wrote in [another post](#) ([archives](#)).³⁵⁶

However, these claims are not based on scientific evidence.

352 “Flat Earth Kosovo” group on Facebook. <https://www.facebook.com/groups/2122813387899650/>.

353 Krypometër. “Cako’s old conspiracy theory that time has not moved is presented as current.” November 2024. <https://kallxo.com/krypometer/teoria-e-vjeter-konspirative-e-cakos-se-koha-nuk-ka-levizur-prezantohet-si-aktuale/>.

354 Ibid.

355 Facebook post. <https://www.facebook.com/alfred.cako/posts/pfbid0yDNoEzc4MFFpErSywKBhkm7ot3JSi4ZX9KDSm2bYQEV7imWNwPB8RmVh6UxzKJtSI> and <https://archive.ph/twtg>.

356 Facebook post. <https://www.facebook.com/alfred.cako/posts/pfbid0HPURYNcVQZeXSyacxHjiJwuLeNwUkP YD8X1xjP-de28kD7wprCD3u3P7FiqqybrQel>, and <https://archive.ph/j5zm1>.

According to the [United Nations \(UN\)](#),³⁵⁷ climate change refers to long-term changes in temperatures and weather patterns. Since the early 19th century, [human activities have been the main driver of climate change](#),³⁵⁸ primarily due to the burning of fossil fuels such as coal, oil, and gas.

[Global warming](#)³⁵⁹ subsequently leads to other impacts such as droughts, water scarcity, severe wildfires, rising sea levels, flooding, melting polar ice, intense storms, and loss of biodiversity.

Therefore, the occurrence of a cold winter in a particular place does not undermine the reality of global warming, as climate change refers to global trends rather than isolated weather events.

According to a report by the Copernicus Climate Change Service (C3S), global temperatures were on average 1.6°C higher compared to the pre-industrial period. [The year 2024 was the hottest year](#)³⁶⁰ on record in a multi-source global temperature dataset dating back to 1850.

There have also been conspiracy posts claiming that wildfires are deliberately caused by the state in order to increase fear of global warming. These posts allege that fires are started by drones.

“Is the planet on fire because of ‘man-made global warming’ (as CNN says), or because of these drones freely sold on Amazon.com for €1,200 each? At least we can all agree on one thing—that in the end, humans are behind the

fires... whether on the keyboard or the control panel,” such posts claim (see [here/archive](#)³⁶¹ and [here/archive](#)³⁶²).

According to a study by the [Metamorphosis Foundation](#),³⁶³ climate skepticism, distorted interpretations, and manipulations that attempt to challenge the scientifically established reality of climate change have deep roots in the Western Balkans—North Macedonia, Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Albania, Montenegro, and Kosovo. The spread of climate disinformation follows patterns and trends already present in the European Union.

The Metamorphosis report notes that in all Western Balkan countries, including Kosovo, there are networks of accounts—most of them anonymous or fake—that regularly share disinformation about climate issues.

Articles published on portals have also been identified (see [here/archive](#)³⁶⁴ and [here/archive](#)³⁶⁵), which claim that, “scientists now say that climate change is a big lie.”

However, climate change refers to long-term changes in the climate system, largely caused by human activity—a fact supported by more than 99% of scientific studies, according to research from [Cornell](#).³⁶⁶

Human activities, such as energy production from fossil fuels, changes in land use, and consumption patterns, have contributed to unprecedented levels of greenhouse gas emissions.

357 United Nations. “What is climate change?” <https://www.un.org/en/climatechange/what-is-climate-change>.

358 IPCC (2022). Climate Change 2021: Summary for Everyone. https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar6/wg1/downloads/outreach/IPCC_AR6_WGI_SummaryForAll.pdf.

359 United Nations. “What is climate change?” <https://www.un.org/en/climatechange/what-is-climate-change>.

360 World Meteorological Organization. “WMO confirms 2024 as the warmest year on record, about 1.55°C above pre-industrial levels.” January 2025. <https://wmo.int/news/media-centre/wmo-confirms-2024-warmest-year-record-about-155degc-above-pre-industrial-level?m>.

361 Facebook video. <https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=524647465474184>, and https://drive.google.com/file/d/1Ble6Y8fckTPmU0wo3R2vGge_LQn9pl8E/view?usp=sharing.

362 Facebook video <https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=524653938806870>, and https://drive.google.com/file/d/1yuMnNTMonKU4HJkEWRbzFU68nqEDa_L/view?usp=sharing.

363 Metamorphosis. “Climate conspiracies in the Western Balkans: Widely imported and constantly repeated.” July 2024. <https://metamorphosis.org.mk/en/publication/climate-conspiracies-in-the-western-balkans-widely-imported-and-per-sistently-repeated/#:~:~%20over%20the>.

364 Bota Sot. “Scientists say climate change is a big lie.” June 2017. <https://www.botaso.t.info/shkence/709811/shkencetaret-thone-se-ndryshimet-klimatike-jane-rrene-e-madhe/>, and <https://archive.ph/Ko0kt>.

365 Kosova Sot Online. “Scientists say climate change is a big lie.” July 2017. <https://www.kosova-sot.info/planeti-x/206318/> and <https://archive.ph/0IEze>.

366 Cornell. “More than 99.9% of studies agree: Humans caused climate change.” October 2021. <https://news.cornell.edu/stories/2021/10/more-999-studies-agree-humans-caused-climate-change>.

The Kremlin's Hand

On the [European Commission's](#)³⁶⁷ website, it is noted that one of the aims of disinformation about climate change is the implementation of policies and international cooperation on climate action.

The article outlines the various forms of disinformation encountered in relation to climate change:

“Climate disinformation can take many forms, from outright denial and conspiracy theories to more subtle and covert disinformation that aims to create confusion by claiming that climate change is not caused by humans or is not as severe as scientists say, and therefore does not require urgent action,” states the article published on the [European Commission's website](#).³⁶⁸

Meanwhile, a study published on [climatepromise.undp.org](#)³⁶⁹ identifies two main sources of climate disinformation: actors with vested interests in the fossil fuel industry who seek to maintain “business as usual” and protect their profits, and actors who aim to benefit from the attention economy—namely individuals or groups who publish sensational or controversial content to generate clicks, advertising revenue, influence, or political support.

According to the [EUvsDisinfo platform](#),³⁷⁰ [122 posts](#) containing disinformation about climate change have been identified, most of which originate from Kremlin-controlled media.

EUvsDisinfo is the flagship project of the [East StratCom Task Force](#),³⁷¹ established in 2015 to identify, analyze, and expose disinformation campaigns—particularly those from pro-Kremlin sources—aimed at manipulating perceptions in Europe and beyond.

In one of the disinformation pieces identified by [EUvsDisinfo](#), it is claimed that the Paris Agreement, adopted on 12 December 2015 during the UN Climate Change Conference (COP21) in Paris, was primarily intended to damage Russia's economy and energy sector.

As [EUvsDisinfo](#)³⁷² explains, the Paris Agreement was not designed to target any specific country, but rather aims to combat climate change by reducing greenhouse gas emissions.

Financing of Disinformation Channels

An important security and public information development occurred during the monitoring period: the arrest of political analyst **Fatmir Sheholli** by the **Special Prosecution of the Republic of Kosovo**, on suspicion of espionage.³⁷³ The case revealed that Sheholli accepted a sum of money from the Serbian secret service, BIA, in order to persuade several media outlets to publish their materials.

BIRN research on Media Ownership Monitor, conducted in cooperation with the Global Media Registry (GMR),³⁷⁴ revealed that out of 44 media outlets included in the study, only 15 (around 30%) agreed to publish ownership and financial information, while the majority do not provide this data and often conceal it from the public.

367 Disinformation on climate change. https://climate.ec.europa.eu/eu-action/climate-disinformation_en

368 Ibid.

369 UNDP. “What is climate disinformation and misinformation and how to confront them?” 2025. <https://climatepromise.undp.org/news-and-stories/what-are-climate-misinformation-and-disinformation-and-how-can-we-tackle-them>.

370 EUvsDisinfo is a platform of the East Stratcom Task Force, bringing together a team of experts with experience primarily in communications, journalism, social sciences, and Russian studies. <https://euvsdisinfo.eu/>.

371 Ibid.

372 Ibid.

373 [Kallxo.com](#). Dosja e Shehollit - Materialet e BIA-s u publikuan në mediat online në Kosovë. 10 tetoe 2025. <https://kallxo.com/lajm/dosja-e-shehollit-materialet-e-bia-s-u-publikuan-ne-mediat-online-ne-kosove/>

374 Media Ownership Monitor. The “Media Ownership Monitor” (MOM) has been developed as a mapping tool in order to create a publicly available, continuously updated database that lists owners of all relevant mass media outlets (press, radio, television sectors and online media). MOM for Kosovo was published on November 29, 2023. <https://www.mom-gmr.org/en/countries/kosovo/>

Media and online platform monitoring over this period has shown that a number of media outlets in Kosovo continue to operate with low transparency standards, failing to disclose funding sources, not clearly identifying sponsored content, and republishing political materials without journalistic processing. These practices create an environment conducive for the spread of disinformation and the manipulation of public opinion. Issues and challenges related to media transparency are addressed in more detail in the third section of the report—Legal Analysis.

Lack of Financial Transparency in the Media

One of the main problems identified during the monitoring period is the lack of financial transparency among online media. Many Kosovo portals fail to publish information regarding their ownership and funding sources, making it difficult to identify political or economic interests that may influence editorial content.

Additionally, a significant number of sponsored articles are not clearly identified. Materials resulting from commercial or political cooperation are often published in the form of news items, without clear labeling indicating their advertising or promotional nature. This practice undermines the fundamental principle of transparency and makes it difficult for the public to distinguish between journalistic information and political propaganda.

Another phenomenon observed during the monitoring is the republication of political party press releases on media portals without journalistic processing and without being identified as sponsored material or as content provided by a political entity.

During the 12-day monitoring period of the campaign for the December 28, 2025 elections, 11 cases were identified in which various portals published political party press releases with text identical to that sent by the party via email. No indication was made whether this was sponsored content or an official party communication.

These portals do not publish the full press releases of other parties in the same manner,

suggesting a selective approach to publishing political materials. This practice transforms the media from an informative intermediary into a direct echo chamber of political communication.

Political Parties' Expenditures on Communication and Advertising

According to the unaudited financial statements of political parties for 2025—a year in which three rounds of elections were held—the largest political parties in the country—the Vetëvendosje Movement, the Democratic Party of Kosovo, the Democratic League of Kosovo, the Alliance for the Future of Kosovo, and the Social Democratic Initiative—spent considerable sums on campaigns. Financial data for 2024 and 2025 reveal that political parties had already begun campaigning and sponsoring content on Facebook as early as 2024, before the official election campaign for the elections held on February 14, 2025 had started.

In 2025 and 2024, Vetëvendosje declared campaign expenditures of €2,731,358 and €163,203, respectively. Under the category “Advertising, representation and conferences,” it reported €297,575 for 2025 and €318,769 for 2024. In its 2025 unaudited financial statements, LVV did not declare any specific expenditures for advertising on television or social media. Only in the section listing payments above €5,000 did LVV include several payments made to media outlets for campaign advertising. Among the reported expenses for 2025 is an expenditure of €48,168 for Meta, which is mainly used for sponsoring political content.

The Democratic Party of Kosovo, under the category “Advertising, representation and conferences,” declared expenditures of €35,685 for 2025 and €109,086 for 2024. It also reported €1,372,562 in campaign expenditures for 2025 and €59,110 for 2024. In the section of payments above €5,000, several payments to media for campaign purposes are listed. Additionally, it reported two cases of sponsorship expenditures on Facebook: one paid directly to Meta in the amount of €25,115 and another paid through the Kosovo-based company “Pro zë Media

LLC” in the amount of €35,000 (i.e., a total of €60,115). Furthermore, PDK declared €12,470 in Facebook sponsorship expenditures in 2024.

The Democratic League of Kosovo, under the category “Advertising, representation and conferences,” declared expenditures of €35,987 for 2025 and €36,438 for 2024. It also reported €688,665 in campaign expenditures for 2025 and €50,597 for 2024. In the section of payments above €5,000, several payments to media for campaign purposes are listed. LDK also declared €64,452 for sponsorships on Meta in 2025, and €50,597 in 2024.

The Alliance for the Future of Kosovo, under the category “Advertising, representation and

conferences,” declared expenditures of only €1,902 for 2025 and €10,752 for 2024. It also reported €357,638 in campaign expenditures for 2025 and €4,302 for 2024. In the section of payments above €5,000, several payments to media for campaign purposes are listed. For Facebook sponsorships in 2025, it declared expenditures of €19,668, and €10,272 for 2024.

The Social Democratic Initiative, in its unaudited financial statements for 2025, declared no election campaign expenditures, despite three rounds of elections having been held during the year. Although it did not report campaign expenditures, this party declared €6,486 in payments for advertising space.

POLITICAL PARTY	YEAR	ELECTION CAMPAIGN (€)	ADVERTISEMENT, REPRESENTATION. & CONFERENCES (€)	SPONSORSHIPS META/FACEBOOK (€)
LVV	2024	163,203	318,769	6,558
	2025	2,731,358	297,575	48,168
PDK	2024	59,110	109,086	12,470
	2025	1,372,562	35,685	60,115
LDK	2024	50,597	36,438	50,597
	2025	688,665	35,987	64,452
AAK	2024	4,302	10,752	10,272
	2025	357,638	1,902	19,668
NISMA	2024	UNDECLARED	UNDECLARED	UNDECLARED
	2025	0	6,486	UNDECLARED

Such data display the growing role of social media platforms in political communication and their influence on the dissemination of political messages during election campaigns.

The media ecosystem in Kosovo, and in the rest of the Balkan region, faces serious challenges related to financial transparency and the influence of external actors in the production of disinformation content. Research conducted during this period shows that a significant portion of investments in media content and publications is difficult to trace, while some investigative cases have raised suspicions about the use of funds from intelligence services and political actors for the production of specific narratives.

Lack of Financial Transparency

For this study, BIRN interviewed institutional officials, including representatives of the Tax Administration, TAK, and security authorities.

According to TAK analyses, our ability to track the financial sources of media in Kosovo is limited and often fails to identify the real origin of the funds.

Regional research indicates that Russian influence in the Balkan media ecosystem through financing is most evident in Serbian media. Investigative journalist Gordana Andric³⁷⁵ emphasizes that Russian influence is present across many digital platforms and social networks. According to her, in addition to major media outlets, there is also a broad network of smaller platforms and influencers that disseminate pro-Russian narratives.

“There is a cluster of pro-Russian YouTubers, mini-sites, and small portals that spread Russian propaganda.”³⁷⁶

In Serbia, Russian media outlets such as Sputnik and Russia Today operate as well, financed by the Russian Federation, producing content that is often republished by other media across the region.

According to researchers like Milica Ljubicic,³⁷⁷ there is no direct evidence that other media in Serbia are financed by Russia; however, there is clear editorial support for pro-Russian narratives.

The Pathways of Disinformation in the Balkans

Fact-checkers have identified that disinformation often follows a specific route in the Western Balkan region. According to analyses by the Albanian fact-checking platform Faktoje.al, part of the content is produced in Russia, translated in Serbia, and then disseminated in Albanian-language online media.

According to journalist Nevila Gjata:

“We have a line that goes Russia–Serbia–Albania and then also into Kosovo. Portals created for clicks often take such materials from Serbian media and publish them without any fact-checking.”³⁷⁸

This content is then further distributed on social media and various portals that often operate without clear editorial standards.

Chinese Influence and “Soft” Narratives

In addition to Russia, China has also been identified as an actor attempting to influence media discourse in the region. However, experts note that the Chinese approach is less confrontational and mainly focused on economic and cultural topics.

According to regional media analyses, Chinese state media have cooperation agreements with a number of media outlets in Serbia and Albania. For example, Chinese media cooperate with the Serbian agency Tanjug, while in Albania, content from Chinese state radio is broadcast in Albanian.

BIRN Albania Editor-in-Chief Besar Likmeta notes that part of this content aims to create negative perceptions of the European Union by highlighting political and social issues in European countries.³⁷⁹

375 Interview with Gordana Andric Simic, Executive Editor at BIRN Serbia. KALLXO Përnime. The interview was conducted for the documentary produced as part of the Midwatch project. “Financing Disinformation” – Full documentary. January 30, 2026. <https://kallxo.com/lajm/financimi-i-dezinformimit-dokumentar-i-plote/>

376 Interview with Gordana Andric Simic, Executive Editor at BIRN Serbia. KALLXO Përnime. The interview was conducted for the documentary produced as part of the Midwatch project. “Financing Disinformation” – Full documentary. January 30, 2026. <https://kallxo.com/lajm/financimi-i-dezinformimit-dokumentar-i-plote/>

377 Interview with Milica Ljubicic, researcher at KRIK. KALLXO Përnime. The interview was conducted on January 20, 2026, for the documentary produced as part of the Midwatch project. “Financing Disinformation” – Full documentary. January 30, 2026. <https://kallxo.com/lajm/financimi-i-dezinformimit-dokumentar-i-plote/>

378 Interview with Nevila Gjata, researcher at Faktoje.al. The interview was conducted on January 20, 2026, for the documentary produced as part of the Midwatch project. “Financing Disinformation” – Full documentary. January 30, 2026. <https://kallxo.com/lajm/financimi-i-dezinformimit-dokumentar-i-plote/>

379 Interview with Besar Likmeta, editor-in-chief at BIRN Albania and [reporter.al](https://www.reporter.al/). The interview was conducted on January 20, 2026, for the documentary produced as part of the Midwatch project. “Financing Disinformation” – Full documentary. January 30, 2026. <https://kallxo.com/lajm/financimi-i-dezinformimit-dokumentar-i-plote/>.

Media Financing from Politics and Businesses

In addition to external actors, part of media financing in Kosovo is linked to politics and local businesses. According to data from the Central Election Commission, political parties have spent over €4.8 million on election campaigns.

However, analysis by Democracy Plus experts reveals discrepancies between incomes and expenditures declared by political parties. According to Albert Krasniqi, some parties have reported expenditures that are not covered by their declared income, raising suspicions of additional funding sources.³⁸⁰

At the same time, the advertising market in Kosovo remains relatively small. According to former chair of the Independent Media Commission, Jeton Mehmeti,³⁸¹ the country's marketing market is around €15 million, making it difficult for the large number of media outlets operating in the country to sustain themselves financially.

This situation creates conditions for the media to seek alternative sources of funding, including advertising from various economic sectors.³⁸²

Businesses and the Disinformation Economy

Construction and real estate are identified as significant sources of media advertising. According to expert analyses, real estate advertisements constitute a considerable portion of media revenues.

Another influential sector in online content is that of dietary supplements and health-related products. Data from Kosovo Customs show that imports of supplements increased from €77 million in 2024 to €86 million in 2025.

Health experts warn that some of these products are promoted through inaccurate or misleading online content.

380 Interview with Albert Krasniqi, Program Director at Democracy Plus. Kallxo Përnime. The interview was conducted on 14 January 2026 for the documentary produced within the Midwatch project. "Financing Disinformation" – Full documentary. 30 January 2026. <https://kallxo.com/lajm/financimi-i-dezinformimit-dokumentar-i-plote/>

381 Interview with Jeton Mehmeti, researcher and former Chair of the Board of the Independent Media Commission. Kallxo Përnime. The interview was conducted on 19 January 2026 for the documentary produced within the Midwatch project. "Financing Disinformation" – Full documentary. 30 January 2026. <https://kallxo.com/lajm/financimi-i-dezinformimit-dokumentar-i-plote/>

382 Ibid.

LIMITED INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITIES TO ADDRESS DISINFORMATION

There is no clear strategy to address disinformation in Kosovo, while institutional capacities are currently not focused on pre-debunking or countering disinformation narratives.

BIRN and Internews Kosovo implemented a series of workshops with security and justice institutions, as well as with officials responsible for institutional communication. The workshops aimed to strengthen participants' capacities to understand the dynamics of disinformation, including its channels, actors, and methods of dissemination. A particular focus of the training was to familiarize participants with effective strategies to counter disinformation, with an emphasis on preventive approaches. Workshops contributed to improving participants' understanding of how these strategies can be applied in practice, aiming to prepare institutional capacities for integrating such measures into their work.

To assess the initial capacities of participating institutions and measure the impact of the workshops, The authors conducted an assessment with representatives from the Prosecution, Courts, Customs, Police, Tax Administration, Local Departments for Security and Emergencies, as well as the Ministries of Internal Affairs, Defense, and Local Government Administration. The assessment collected both qualitative and quantitative data to better understand participants' practices in combating disinformation, their awareness of current developments in this field, and their understanding of the strategies presented during the workshops.

Methodology


The assessment was carried out through interviews with participants before and after the workshops, to evaluate changes in their knowledge and understanding of disinformation dissemination, its sources, and preventive measures to combat it. Out of 90 workshop participants, around 70 completed the pre-workshop questionnaire and 55 completed the post-workshop questionnaire, providing a solid basis for comparative analysis of changes. Questionnaires included a combination of open-ended and closed questions, enabling the collection of both qualitative data and quantitative measurements. Responses were systematically analyzed through a coding process, allowing for the identification of key themes, patterns, and changes in participants' level of familiarity with the strategies presented during the workshops.

Key findings

Prior to the workshop, most institutional representatives reported limited or no knowledge of pre-debunking concepts. After the workshop, the majority of participants became familiar with these concepts as essential tools for effectively addressing disinformation, demonstrating a clear shift in both understanding and perception of their importance. This represents a positive indicator of the capacity of participating institutions to effectively absorb such interventions. The results suggest initial practical steps toward developing specific protocols and communication strategies aimed at addressing disinformation and foreign malign influence.

Development of Inter-institutional Capacities for Building Strategies to Counter Disinformation

pre and post interviews



Participants most frequently identified social media and questionable or unverified media (primarily online platforms) as the main sources of disinformation. Additionally, some representatives explicitly mentioned China, Russia, and Serbia as foreign actors posing disinformation-related threats. Interest groups, political stakeholders, and individuals with malicious intent were also identified as sources of disinformation in more general responses.

When asked to mention recent cases and reporting on disinformation, the most commonly cited were narratives related to their specific institutions (particularly police and security), false or manipulated information concerning interethnic relations in Kosovo (including the Banjska attack and tensions in the north), as well as reporting related to elections. Some


participants also referred to more in-depth research reports, mainly published by civil society organizations in Kosovo.

Media monitoring was already a familiar practice to the participants prior to the workshop. However, the training contributed to a deeper understanding of systematic monitoring approaches and highlighted the importance of integrating new technological tools into everyday institutional work. Specifically, when asked about cooperation with technology companies, most participants considered it essential. This underscores both the need and the willingness of these institutions to enhance their capacities and continuously adapt to technological and methodological developments in order to improve communication and responses to disinformation.

Development of Inter-institutional Capacities for Building Strategies to Counter Disinformation

Do you consider cooperation with information technology companies necessary to combat disinformation?

data gathered after the workshop




After the workshop, officials demonstrated a more comprehensive, structured, and analytical approach when describing the techniques they intend to use to counter disinformation.

Compared to pre-workshop responses, a larger number of participants emphasized cooperation with media, as well as proactive and preventive measures.

Development of Inter-institutional Capacities for Building Strategies to Counter Disinformation

List three techniques that you will use to address disinformation in your institutions
data gathered after the workshop



ANNEX

ANNEX 1

WEBSITE	CATEGORY
1. 04online	Entertainment Website
2. 2L Online	News Website
3. Aktiv press	News Website
4. Albanian Post	News Website
5. Albswiss	News Website
6. Alternativna	News Website
7. Arberia TV	Monthly Newspaper
8. Arbresh	News Website
9. ATV Live	TV Station
10. Ballkani info	News Website
11. Betimi për Drejtësi	News Website
12. Bota Press	News Website
13. Bota Sot	News Website
14. Buletini Ekonomik	News Website
15. Dardania Press	News Website
16. Demokracia	News Website
17. Drejtësia Sot	News Website
18. Drenica online	News Website
19. Drenica press	News Website
20. Dukagjini	TV Station
21. DW	Radio Station
22. Ekonomia Online	News Website
23. Epilogu	News Website
24. Epoka e Re	News Website
25. Evropa e Lirë	Radio Station
26. Fakte Plus	News Website
27. Ferizaj press	News Website
28. Ferizaj24	News Website
29. Front Online	News Website
30. Gazeta Alo	News Website
31. Gazeta e Prizrenit	News Website
32. Gazeta e re	Daily Newspaper
33. Gazeta Express	News Website
34. Gazeta Mejdani	News Website
35. Gazeta Mergata Press	News Website
36. Gazeta Metro	News Website

37. Gazeta Olle	Sport Website
38. Gazeta Politika	News Website
39. Gazeta Scanner	News Website
40. Gazeta Shneta	Entertainment Website
41. Gazeta10	TV Station
42. GazetaBlic	News Website
43. Gjakova Portal	News Website
44. Gjakova Press	News Website
45. Gjilani info	News Website
46. Gracanica online	News Website
47. Illyria	Daily Newspaper
48. Indeks online	News Website
49. Info Kosova	News Website
50. Infokusi	News Website
51. Insajderi	News Website
52. Insajderi.org	News Website
53. Jedinstvo	News Website
54. Jepi zë	News Website
55. Jeta Online	News Website
56. Kallxo	News Website
57. Katror	News Website
58. Klan Kosova	TV Station
59. Klina info	News Website
60. Koha.net	Daily Newspaper
61. Kontakt Plus Mitrovica	Radio Station
62. Korneri	Sport Website
63. Korrespondenti	News Website
64. Kosova ime	News Website
65. Kosova info	News Website
66. Kosova live	News Website
67. Kosova Post	News Website
68. KosovaPress	News Website
69. Kosovo Online	News Website
70. KoSSev	News Website
71. Kryelajmi	News Website
72. Kultplus	Entertainment Website
73. Lajmi.net	News Website
74. Lipjani News	News Website
75. Malisheva TV	TV Station
76. Medija centar	News Website

77. Mekulli press	News Website
78. Mesazhi	News Website
79. Mitropol	News Website
80. Mitrovica sot	News Website
81. Most TV Zvecan	TV Station
82. Nacionale	News Website
83. Njeshi	News Website
84. Opoja TV	TV Station
85. OralInfo	News Website
86. Paparaci	Entertainment Website
87. Parrotlla	News Website
88. Periskopi	News Website
89. Podujeva press	News Website
90. Presheva Jone	News Website
91. Prishtina Press	Monthly Newspaper
92. Prive	Entertainment Website
93. Prizren Post	News Website
94. Prizren Press	News Website
95. Prizreni Sot	News Website
96. Radio Gora	Radio Station
97. Radio Goraždevac	Radio Station
98. Radio KIM	Radio Station
99. Radio Kosova e Lire	Radio Station
100. Radio Mitrovica Sever	Radio Station
101. Radio Sharri	Radio Station
102. Radio Star Gjilan	Radio Station
103. Radio Televizija Gracanica	TV Station
104. Rahoveci24	News Website
105. Rajoni press	News Website
106. Reporteri	News Website
107. Revista Kosovarja	Entertainment Website
108. Riznica	News Website
109. RTK	TV Station
110. RTK 2	TV Station
111. RTV 21	TV Station
112. RTV Besa	TV Station
113. RTV Kiss	TV Station
114. RTV Mir	News Website
115. RTV Puls	TV Station
116. Shqip	News Website

117. Shtime press	News Website
118. Sinjali	News Website
119. Suhareka Express	News Website
120. Suhareka Online	News Website
121. Syri.net Kosova	News Website
122. SyriV TV	TV Station
123. Telegrafi	News Website
124. Televizioni 7	Monthly Newspaper
125. tëvë1	TV Station
126. TV Tema	TV Station
127. Veriu	News Website
128. VOX	News Website
129. Vushtrria Online	News Website
130. Zeri	Daily Newspaper
131. 20minutes	International
132. Al Jazeera	International
133. BBC	International
134. Bild	International
135. CBS News	International
136. CNN	International
137. Daily Mail	International
138. DW	International
139. Focus	International
140. Fox News	International
141. HuffPost	International
142. Le Figaro	International
143. Le Monde	International
144. Linternaute	International
145. NBC News	International
146. NY Times	International
147. People's Daily	International
148. Reuters	International
149. Spiegel	International
150. Telegraph	International
151. Washington Post	International
152. Welt	International
153. Yahoo News	International
154. Zeit	International

ANNEX 2

Interviews conducted for five documentaries produced as part of this project from October 2025 to February 2026. These interviews also informed the analysis in this report.

1. Adnan Merovci – former Chief Executive Officer of the Central Election Commission, Kosovo – Interview conducted on 19 November 2025.
2. Agim Mazreku – external advisor, Ministry of Environment, Spatial Planning and Infrastructure, Kosovo – Interview conducted on 29 October 2025.
3. Alban Zeneli – university professor, Department of Journalism, University of Prishtina, Kosovo – Interview conducted on 18 February 2026.
4. Albert Krasniqi – Program Director, Democracy Plus, Kosovo – Interview conducted on 14 January 2026.
5. Benjamin Kolenovic – CEO / Founder, Growzillas – Interview conducted on 28 January 2026.
6. Berat Rukiqi – former Chairman, Kosovo Chamber of Commerce, Kosovo – Interview conducted on 27 October 2025.
7. Bernard Nikaj – former Minister of Trade and Industry and Ambassador in Brussels, Kosovo – Interview conducted on 22 October 2025.
8. Besa Ismaili – former Member of the Assembly of Kosovo – Interview conducted on 10 December 2025.
9. Besar Likmeta – editor, BIRN, Albania – Interview conducted on 20 January 2026.
10. Brikenda Rexhepi – Chairperson, Kosovo Media Council, Kosovo – Interview conducted on 23 January 2026.
11. Bujar Dugolli – former Minister of Trade and Industry, Kosovo – Interview conducted on 23 October 2026.
12. Burim Piraj – “Meka,” Kosovo – Interview conducted on 24 October 2025.
13. Burim Ramadani – former Inspector General, Kosovo Intelligence Agency (AKI), Kosovo – Interview conducted on 11 December 2025.
14. Dren Gërguri – university professor, Department of Journalism, University of Prishtina, Kosovo – Interview conducted on 18 February 2026.
15. Ekrem Avdiu – Islamic Community of Kosovo, Mitrovica – Interview conducted on 4 December 2025.
16. Enver Hoxhaj – former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Kosovo – Interview conducted on 19 November 2025.
17. Eugen Cakolli – Program Manager, Kosovo Democratic Institute – Interview conducted on 16 January 2026.
18. Fahri Musliu – former RTK correspondent in Belgrade – Interview conducted on 4 December 2025.
19. Fikrije Fejzullahu – prosecutor, Special Prosecution Office, Kosovo – Interview conducted on 20 January 2026.
20. Fitim Gashi – Executive Director, S’bunker, Kosovo – Interview conducted on 20 November 2025.
21. Flamur Kadriu – Food and Veterinary Agency, Kosovo – Interview conducted on 23 October 2025.
22. Gordana Andric – Executive Editor, BIRN, Serbia – Interview conducted on 20 January 2026.
23. Haki Shatri – former Minister of Finance, Kosovo – Interview conducted on 22 October 2025.

24. Iryna Synelnyk – journalist, Ukraine – Interview conducted on 18 February 2026.
25. Jeta Loshaj – researcher, KCSS, Kosovo – Interview conducted on 18 November 2025.
26. Jeton Mehmeti – researcher, former Chair of the Board of the Independent Media Commission – Interview conducted on 19 January 2026.
27. Linda Çavdarbasha – environmental activist, Kosovo – Interview conducted on 29 October 2025.
28. Lulzim Peci – Executive Director, KIPRED, Kosovo – Interview conducted on 4 December 2025.
29. Lutfi Haziri – former Deputy Prime Minister of Kosovo – Interview conducted on 13 November 2025.
30. Maria Popovic – journalist, Serbia – Interview conducted on 24 November 2025.
31. Melazim Koci – political analyst and journalist, Kosovo – Interview conducted on 18 February 2026.
32. Milena Popovic – Editor-in-Chief, Istinomer, Serbia – Interview conducted on 20 January 2026.
33. Milica Ljubovic – researcher at KRIK – Interview conducted on 20 January 2026.
34. Mimoza Kusari-Lila – former Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Trade and Industry, Kosovo – Interview conducted on 23 October 2025.
35. Miodrag Milicevic – Executive Director, NGO Aktiv, Kosovo – Interview conducted on 5 December 2025.
36. Murat Mehmeti – investigator, Kosovo Tax Administration
37. Nenad Rasic – former Deputy Speaker of the Assembly of Kosovo – Interview conducted on 12 November 2025.
38. Nevila Gjata – Editor-in-Chief, Faktoje.al, Albania – Interview conducted on 20 January 2026.
39. Nexhmedin Spahiu – journalist, Kosovo – Interview conducted on 4 December 2025.
40. Norik Selimi – founder and director, Pikasa, North Macedonia
41. Ramiz Kelmendi – former Deputy Prime Minister / businessman, Kosovo – Interview conducted on 22 October 2025.
42. Representative from the Kosovo Police – Department of Analysis – Interview conducted on 8 December 2025.
43. Rrezarta Delibashzade-Krasniqi – Executive Director, D4D, Kosovo – Interview conducted on 18 November 2025.
44. Rudina Jakupi – researcher, Kosovo – Interview conducted on 4 December 2025.
45. Skender Prestreshi – Prevent Institute, Kosovo – Interview conducted on 18 November 2025.
46. Tijana Uzelac – Project Manager, BIRN, Serbia – Interview conducted on 24 November 2025.
47. Veli Halimi – “Sharri”, Kosovo – Interview conducted on 24 October 2025.
48. Vese Kelmendi – Regional Advisor for Western Balkans, GCERF – Interview conducted on 18 November 2025.
49. Viktor Berisha – environmental policy expert, Kosovo – Interview conducted on 29 October 2025.
50. Viktoriia Voronina – Executive Director, CENSS, Ukraine – Interview conducted on 16 December 2025.
51. Visa Prebreza – editor, “Krypometër,” Kosovo – Interview conducted on 31 October 2025.
52. Vlora Çitaku – former Ambassador of Kosovo to the USA / Secretary General of PDK – Interview conducted on 24 November 2025.

